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EXECUTING RAPISTS: A RELUCTANT ESSAY ON THE
ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
MICHAEL MELLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
He didn't clean war up a bit, nor did he add a drop of extra
crimson.... Like the fellow says, facts are plain unbeatable.'
Since Gary Gilmore's state-assisted suicide in 1977,2 more than
400 people have been executed in America - all for capital
murder.3 More than 3,000 prisoners live on America's death rows,
awaiting execution - all for murder.4 No person has been executed
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; B.A. Mary Washington College, 1979; J.D.
University of Virginia, 1982.
I am deeply grateful to Judy Hilts, who word processed this essay; to Jeff Robinson and
Deanna Mello, with whom I have often discussed the ideas in this essay over the years; and
to the students of my capital punishment seminar at Vermont Law School, particularly Paul
Perkins, Andrea Rau, Lynn Felici, Nancy Norelli, and Tracy Pugliese, whose thoughts are
reflected in virtually every page of this essay.
This essay is dedicated to the courage of two poets: Samuel Hazo and Edward Kanter.
Socrates, in the dialogue Laches, distinguished between "foolish endurance" and "wise
endurance"; "only the wise endurance is courage." Socrates, Laches, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 55, 68 (B. Jowett trans., 1892). Building upon Laches, Tim O'Brien, in his 1969
Vietnam memoir, If IDie in a Combat Zone, argues that:
[mien must know what they do is courageous, they must know it is right, and
that kind of knowledge is wisdom and nothing else. Which is why I know few
brave men. Either they are stupid and do not know what is right. Or they know
what is right and cannot bring themselves to do it.... Or they know what is
right and do it, but do not feel and understand the fear that must be overcome.
TIM O'BRIEN, IF I DIE IN A COMBAT ZONE 137 (1969) (emphasis added).
O'Brien was looking for courage - in himself and those around him - in Vietnam. He
was looking for "proper courage," courage "exercised by men who know what they do is
proper. Proper courage is wise courage. It's acting wisely, acting wisely when fear would
have a man act otherwise. It is the endurance of the soul in spite of fear - wisely." Id. at
131. Courage is partly experience and partly reflection of that experience. O'Brien's heroes
in Vietnam "had been out long enough to know; experienced and wise .... Realistic and able
to speak the truth. Conceited? Never. And, most strikingly, each of the heroes thought
about courage, cared about being brave, at least enough to talk about it and wonder to others
about it." Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
What Plato and Tim O'Brien define, Sam Hazo and Edward Kanter personify.
"Inasmuch as you have done to the least of my brothers [and sisters], you have done to me."
Matthew 25:40.
1. ALLAN GURGANUS, OLDEST LIVING CONFEDERATE WIDOW TELLS ALL 53 (1984)
[hereinafter, CONFEDERATE WIDOW].
2. See generally NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1977).
3. See DEATH ROW, USA (NAACP ed., 1997) (unpublished compilation).
4. See id.
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in America for a non-homicide offense since 1964. 5 In 1977, the
Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia6 that death is, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, an excessive punishment for the crime
of raping an adult woman.
All of this may be about to change.7 In 1995 Louisiana became
the first state post-Coker to enact a statute authorizing death for
offenders who rape a child under age twelve.8 Under the statute,
Anthony Wilson was charged by grand jury indictment with the
aggravated rape of a five year old girl. His motion to quash the
indictment, which alleged that the death penalty was not autho-
rized for a crime of rape, was granted by the trial court. The state
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In a parallel case, Patrick Dewayne Bethley was charged with
raping three girls - ages five, seven, and nine - one of whom was
his daughter.9 At the time of the rapes, Bethley allegedly knew he
was HIV-positive. Bethley filed a motion to quash the indictment,
arguing that the statute authorizing the death penalty was
unconstitutional. The trial court granted the defendant's motion,
finding that the statute was unconstitutional because the class of
death-eligible defendants was not sufficiently narrowed. The state
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which considered the
two cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the death penalty was
not an excessive punishment for the crime of rape of a child under
the age of twelve, nor was it susceptible to arbitrary and capricious
application in the case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve.
The court rejected the defendants' challenges, distinguishing Coker
v. Georgia. According to the Wilson court, the plurality in Coker
"took great pains in referring only to the rape of an adult woman
throughout their opinion, leaving open the question of the rape of
5. See WILLIAM BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE app. A at 395 (1984).
6. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
7. John Q. Barrett, Death for Child Rapists May Not Save Children, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
18, 1997, at A21; Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment for Killers Only?, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1997, at 30.
8. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
LA. R[EV]. S[TAT]. 14:42(C) was amended by [1995 LA. ACTS 397] of the
Louisiana Legislature. This amendment began as House Bill 55 which passed
in the House of Representatives with a vote of 79 yeas to 22 nays. The Bill was
then sent to the Senate which passed it with a vote of 34 yeas to 1 nay. The Bill
was then signed into law by Governor Edwards on [June 17, 1995] to become
effective on [August 15, 1995].
Id. at 1067 n.5.
9. See id. at 1065.
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a child."1 The rape victim in Coker, however, was only sixteen-
years-old."
To determine whether a penalty is excessive as applied to a
particular class of crime, the Wilson court reasoned, one must look
to the "evolving standards of decency." 2 The Louisiana Supreme
Court found that the Louisiana legislature had determined a
"standard of decency"' 3 by amending the law to permit capital
punishment in cases of child rape. "[D]eference must be given to
that decision," the court explained. 4
The court acknowledged that Louisiana was the only state to
authorize death for child rapists, but found that "it [did] not do
without the suggestion of some trend or suggestion from several
other states that their citizens desire the death penalty for such a
heinous crime."15  The court concluded that a state's capital
10. Id. at 1066. The Wilson court also observed:
The various justices, either in the plurality opinion, concurring opinion, or
dissenting opinion, refer to "adult woman" fourteen times: (1) Justice White,
writing for the plurality, writes: 'That question, with respect to rape of an adult
woman, is now before us." Coker, supra at 592 .... (2) Justice White: "we seek
guidance ... concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an
adult woman." Id. at 593 .... (3) Justice White: "[Four] of the [sixteen] States
did not take the mandatory course and also did not continue rape of an adult
woman as a capital offense." Id. at 596 .... (4) Justice White: 'The upshot is
that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction ... that authorizes a sentence of death
when the rape victim is an adult woman.. . ." Id. at 596 .... (5) Justice White:
"but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment
as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." Id. at 596 .... (6) Justice
White: "death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an
adult woman." Id. at 597. (7) Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, writes: "ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for the crime
of raping an adult woman." Id. at 601 .... (8) Chief Justice Burger, in his
dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist, writes: "Since the Court now invalidates
the death penalty as a sanction for all rapes of adults.... ." Id. at 611 .... (9)
Chief Justice Burger: "Georgia is the sole jurisdiction ... that authorizes a
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman." Id. at 613 .... (10)
Chief Justice Burger: "Louisiana and North Carolina have enacted death
penalty statutes for adult rape ..." Id. at 613 .... (11) Chief Justice Burger:
"Failure of more States to enact statutes imposing death for rape of an adult
woman... ." Id. at 614 .... (12) Chief Justice Burger: "Georgia has been the
only State whose adult rape death penalty statute has not otherwise been
invalidated ...." Id. at 615 .... (13) Chief Justice Burger: "an appropriate
punishment for the rape of an adult woman. . . ." Id. at 615 .... (14) Chief
Justice Burger: "rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping
an adult woman .... Id. at 618 ....
Id. at n.2.
11. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 607-08 n.2 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1067.
13. Id.
14. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996).
15. Id. at 1069. In Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi
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punishment law is not unconstitutional "simply because that
jurisdiction chose to be first."'6
The Wilson court accurately predicted that Louisiana would not
long remain alone in making capital punishment an option, even
when the crime committed produced no death. The court reasoned:
"given the appalling nature of the crime, the severity of the crime
inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed on society, the
death penalty is not an excessive penalty when the victim is a child
under the age of twelve years old."' 7 This prediction proved pro-
phetic. In 1997, Georgia enacted its own bill authorizing capital
punishment for child rape."8
The Wilson court concluded:
While Louisiana is the only state that permits the death
penalty for the rape of a child less than twelve, it is difficult to
believe that it will remain alone in punishing rape by death if
the years ahead demonstrate a dramatic reduction in the
incidence of child rape, an increase in cooperation by rape
victims in the apprehension and prosecution of rapists, and a
greater confidence in the role of law on the part of the people.
This experience will be a consideration for this and other states'
legislatures.
Supreme Court ducked an opportunity to decide whether Coker applied to child rapists.
Alfred Dale Leatherwood was convicted of raping an 11-year-old girl in 1985 and sentenced
to death. On appeal, Leatherwood "argue[d] that imposition of the death penalty for rape
violates... Coker .. " Id. at 402. The court found that it "need not address the question
of whether Coker would be applicable to rape of a child . . . because it is clear that
(Mississippi statutes) preclude imposition of the death penalty." Id. The court ordered a
retrial on other grounds.
16. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1069.
Louisiana is the only state that has a law in effect that provides for the death
penalty for the rape of a child less than twelve. This fact, however, cannot be
deemed determinative. The Coker court pointed out in its discussion of the
history of the death penalty that three states, Florida, Mississippi, and
Tennessee authorized the death penalty in rape cases when the victim was a
child and the offender was an adult.... The Tennessee statute was invalidated
in 1977 because the death sentence was mandatory. Id. And as previously
noted, Florida's and Mississippi's death statutes were invalidated in 1981 and
1989 respectively. The Florida Supreme Court found the Coker analysis
controlling in its invalidation of their statute, but the Mississippi Supreme
Court invalidated the death penalty for the rape of a child without ever passing
on the constitutionality of the law. Even though these states' statutes were
subsequently invalidated, the simple fact that they enacted such statutes since
the Furman decision may suggest the beginning of a trend and public opinion
favoring such penalties - an evolution of a standard to deal with this heinous
crime.
Id. at 1068 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 1070.
18. See Higgins, supra note 7.
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Our holding today permits the death penalty without a
death actually occurring. In reaching this conclusion, we give
great deference to our legislature's determination of the
appropriateness of the penalty. This is not to say, however, that
the legislature has free reign in proscribing penalties. They
must still conform to the mandates of the Eighth Amendment
and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution, and they are
still subject to judicial review by the courts. We hold only that
in the case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve, the
death penalty is not an excessive punishment nor is it suscepti-
ble of being applied arbitrarily and capriciously. 9
On June 2, 1997, the United States Supreme Court denied
Wilson's and Bethley's petitions for writ of certiorari.2 ° Accompany-
ing the denial was a statement by Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, reiterating that a decision to deny a
petition for writ of certiorari "does not in any sense constitute a
ruling on the merits of the case in which the writ is sought."'"
Stevens found it "worth noting the existence of an arguable
jurisdictional bar"2 to review by the high court - the fact that
neither defendant had yet been convicted of any crime.
According to an August 18, 1997 estimate, in addition to those
two accused capital rapists now facing trial, "about [thirty] other
pending Louisiana rape cases, may now go to trial and produce
death sentences."23 Louisiana's capital statute for child rapists is
a "harbinger of new efforts."24 In April 1997, Georgia passed a
statute similar to Louisiana's.25 "A Montana state senator
19. Wilson, 685 So. 2d. at 1073. Chief Justice Calogero dissented, finding the statute
facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
20. See Bethley v. Louisana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
21. Id. at 2425.
22. Id.
23. Barrett, supra note 7.
24. Id.
25. See Higgins, supra note 7. This article prompted two fascinating letters.
I was lead counsel in State of Louisiana v. Bethley, in which the state supreme
court upheld the death penalty for statutory rape ("Is Capital Punishment for
Killers Only?" August, page 30). Had your reporter called me, he would have
learned:
, Women's and victim's rights groups filed an amici curiae brief in support
of the defendant. Statutory rape is vastly underreported, they explained, in
large part because about 95 percent of child victims are attacked by family or
close family friends, and the overwhelming majority are attacked by their
father or stepfather. "[A]uthorizing the death penalty for this crime will only
make victims and their mothers even less willing to come forward," amici
argued.
19971 133
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introduced death penalty legislation for second convictions of rape
involving serious bodily injury. Pennsylvania's Republican party
seeks death penalty legislation for repeated sexual assaults on
children."2
Once these new statutes produce actual death sentences, the
Supreme Court will be confronted with the constitutional question
it reserved in Coker: assuming that the Constitution forbids the
executions of rapists of adult women (as Coker held), does the
Amici also stated that capital punishment would intensify the already-
substantial fear, stress and guilt of victims who agree to assist law enforce-
ment.
- The racial issue is one of the key ones raised by Louisiana's law. All
statistical analyses of pre-Furman rape cases found no correlation between
victim's age and the likelihood of a defendant execution. The critical variables
were the victim's and defendant's races. A recent study shows Louisiana
executed 14 rape defendants since 1941: All were black, and 13 of the victims
were white. Furthermore, of the three cases known to involve victims under
age 18, all involved black defendants and white victims.
John Holdridge
New Orleans
To say I enthusiastically join District Attorney Jerry Jones' opinion that
Coker v. Georgia was wrongly decided would be stating my opinion languidly.
The facts are curdling. Coker, who was convicted in three rapes, first raped
and stabbed to death a young woman. Eight months later he raped, stripped
and clubbed a 16-year-old, leaving her for dead in the woods. For the conviction
upon which the plurality based its wrong-headed decision, Coker invaded a
home, bound a young husband, stripped a 16-year-old bride, held a butcher
knife to her neck and raped her repeatedly in front of her husband. That, the
Y chromosomes on the Coker Court blandly described, was "moderately brutal,"
not worthy of the death penalty.
I was reminded of this attitude by a male colleague's lunchtime response to
reports of a molestation/rape that began when a girl was [five] and continued
into her mid-teens. Discussing the case, he observed, "I hear it's kinds hard for
women to get over that. Pass the butter, please."
That and similar comments lead me to conclude that, in general, most men
do not understand the horror that sexual assault injects into women's lives.
Yet, upon hearing of a man's rape of a boy, most men immediately, on a gut
level, identify with the victim's horror. Perhaps by binding the psychic images
of male-male rape to male-female rape, female victims may achieve a greater
degree of justice and stronger penalties against sexual predators.
Unfortunately, but perhaps appropriately, Lady Justice has been bound,
gagged and blindfolded to the atrocity, all the while having a testosterone-laced
voice whisper in her ear that the crime is only moderately brutal. I see no time,
even on the distant horizon, when she can unblind herself and give voice to
what her own eyes might see.
Ronda R. Storms
Tampa, Fla.
Letter to the Editor, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 10.
26. Barrett, supra note 7.
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Constitution also forbid the executions of rapists of children? In
other words, should Coker be extended to cover child rapists?27
The question presented by the new child rape statutes -
whether Coker should be extended to include this class of offenses
- is important and interesting in its own right.2" I agree with
Professor John Barrett's suggestion that a principled line could be
crafted between rapists of children and rapists of adults. The
"spate of legislation providing for death penalties in child rape cases
may thus help to establish its constitutionality." 9 Further, "[Forty-
five] states and the federal government [have] acted to protect
children from nearby convicted sex offenders by enacting 'Megan's
Laws' that require community notification. The next step could be
death penalty laws that try to eliminate the possibility that
convicted sex offenders will return to the community."3 ° Further,
"death sentences under the new statutes would not be vulnerable
to arguments (raised in Coker by Ms. Ginsburg in a brief for the
ACLU) that they are vestiges of viewing rape victims as male
27. One state supreme court ruled, in the years following Coker and basing its reasoning
on Coker, that when no life is taken, "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla.
1981); accord Nussdorf v. State, 495 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Perez v. State,
545 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. 1989) (Overton, J., dissenting). The statute invalidated in Buford
authorized the death penalty for sexual assault on a person age 11 or younger. "After
Buford, death was no longer a possible penalty in Florida for sexual battery [i.e., rape],
regardless of the age of the victim." Cooper v. State, 453 So. 2d 67, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
28. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Wilson argued:
Rape of a child less than twelve years of age is like no other crime. Since
children cannot protect themselves, the State is given the responsibility to
protect them. Children are a class of people that need special protection; they
are particularly vulnerable since they are not mature enough nor capable of
defending themselves. A "maturing society", through its legislature has
recognized the degradation and devastation of child rape, and the permeation
of harm resulting to victims of rape in this age category. The damage a child
suffers as a result of rape is devastating to the child as well as to the commu-
nity. As noted previously, in determining whether a penalty is excessive, the
Supreme Court has declared that we should take into account the "evolving
standards of decency," and in making this determination, the courts should not
look to their own subjective conceptions, but should look instead to the
conceptions of modern American society as reflected by objective evidence. As
evidence of society's attitudes, we look to the judgment of the state legislators,
who are representatives of society.
State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996).
29. Barrett, supra note 7.
30. Id.
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property." 1  The Supreme Court does have some experience
drawing age-based lines in cases involving capital murder.32
The sixteen-year-old rape victim in Coker was, under Georgia
law, a minor. In Georgia, a minor is defined as a person under age
eighteen unless otherwise provided by statute.33 A person under
age eighteen cannot vote in any Georgia state-wide primary or
general election,34 or in any municipal primary or election;35 cannot
serve as a grand juror;38  cannot buy or possess alcoholic
beverages; " cannot play bingo31 or assist in the conduct of bingo;
39
31. Id. As in Coker, however, several women's groups in the Louisiana cases filed amici
briefs opposing capital punishment in those cases. See, Letter to the Editor, supra note 25.
32. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989). In an amici curiae brief in Thompson, James Coleman and I argued that the
Constitution sets a minimum age of 18 for eligibility for execution. See generally Brief of the
National Legal Aid Association and Defender Association, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the American Jewish Committee as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169). [hereinafter
National Legal Aid Briet].
33. See GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1 (1995).
34. See § 21-2-219 (1993).
35. See § 21-3-125 (1993).
36. See § 15-12-60(a) (1994).
37. See § 3-3-23(a)(2) (1990) (stating that a person must be 21-years-old to buy alcohol).
Georgia's statutory minimum drinking age reflects a national trend to raise the drinking age
from 18 to 21. In 1984 Congress overwhelmingly passed the National Minimum Drinking Age
Act withholding federal highway funds from states that failed to raise their drinking age to
21. The House of Representatives agreed to the measure by unanimous consent without
reported debate.
The focus of the Senate debate was that teenagers should be singled out for special
treatment because:
[Tihe facts speak for themselves. Teenagers comprise only [eight] percent of the
population, drive only [six] percent of all highway miles, yet are involved in
15% of all alcohol-related accidents. Studies by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration have demonstrated that the rate of alcohol-related
crashes declined dramatically, an average 28%, just after the age of 21.
130 CONG. REC. 18,676 (1984) (remarks by Sen. Mattingly).
As a rule, young people under the age of 21 are, generally, still inexperienced,
both as drinkers and drivers. The consequences of this inexperience are often
reflected in statistics about highway death and accidents. It is our responsibility
to protect these drivers from these consequences . . . [and from] youthful
recklessness.
Id. at 18,680 (remarks by Sen. Byrd). "Statistics indicate that we have to do something to
help this particular age group of our society against their own actions and misconduct." Id.
at 18,663 (remarks by Sen. Exon). See also id. at 18,670-71 (remarks by Sen. Durenberger).
An editorial from the Christian Science Monitor, read into the Congressional Record,
appeared to capture the tone of the proponents of the national minimum drinking age:
"Although many young people are mature in outlook, large numbers of others are not. This
lack of maturity leads some to use bad judgment by driving while intoxicated; in another two
or three years they would be more likely to use better judgment." Id. at 18,642.
38. See § 16-12-58 (1996).
39. See § 16-12-58 (1996).
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cannot obtain a driver's license without parental consent;40 cannot
obtain a license to carry a pistol or revolver 41 or to sell firearms;42
cannot consent to most forms of medical treatment;43 cannot refuse
medical treatment;44 cannot donate any part of his or her body as a
gift to take effect upon death;45 cannot serve as a notary public, 46
court reporter,47 clerk,48 district attorney,49 judge, 0 county
administra-tor,5' or state adjutant general;52 cannot hold public
office; 3 cannot be licensed or employed as a peace officer, 54 state
trooper,55 narcotics agent,56 firefighter, 7 pharmacist,5" dietician,59
nursing home administrator,"0 dispensing optician,6 private
detective," or assistant employed by a private detective, 3 real
estate sales-person6 4 or broker;65 cannot be an incorporator of a
bank or trust company;' cannot be a director of a business corpora-
tion;67 and cannot be a director of a nonprofit corporation.68
40. See § 40-5-26(a) (1997); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-26(b) (1997) (stating that the
driver's license of any person under age 21 shall be readily distinguishable in appearance
from the license of persons over age 21).
41. See § 16-11-129 (1996) (stating licensee must be at least 21-years-old).
42. See § 43-16-3 (1994) (requiring seller to be 21-years-old).
43. See § 31-9-2(a)(1) (1996); c.f. § 31-9-2(a)(3), (5) (1985) (stating, for example, that any
married person may consent for himself or his spouse; female may consent for herself when
given in connection with pregnancy or the prevention thereof or childbirth).
44. See § 31-9-7 (1996).
45. See § 44-5-143(a) (1991).
46. See § 45-17-2(a) (1990).
47. See § 15-14-29 (1994).
48. See § 15-60-50 (b)(1)(D) (1994) (requiring clerk to be 25-years-old).
49. See § 15-18-3 (1994) (requiring district attorney to be 25-years-old).
50. See §§ 15-6-4, 15-9-4(b) (1994) (requiring judge to be at least 30-years-old).
51. See § 53-6-91(a) (1997) (stating that court administrator must be 21-years-old).
52. See § 38-2-150 (1995) (stating that adjuntant general must be 30-years-old).
53. See § 45-2-1(1) (1990) (stating that a person must be 21-years-old to hold public office,
except where local ordinance provides for age 18 to hold county or municipal offices, except
such offices of a judicial nature).
54. See § 35-8-8 (1993).
55. See § 35-2-43 (1993) (stating that a state trooper must be 21-years-old).
56. See § 35-3-9(e) (1993).
57. See § 25-4-89(a)(1) (1997).
58. See § 26-4-72(a)(1) (1997).
59. See § 43-11A-9 (1994).
60. See § 43-27-6 (1994) (requiring administrator to be 21-years-old).
61. See § 43-29-7 (1994).
62. See § 43-38-6(b)(1) (1994).
63. See § 43-38-7(c)(1) (1994).
64. See § 43-40-8(a)(1) (1994).
65. See § 43-40-8(b)(1) (1994).
66. See § 7-1-390 (1994).
67. See 14-2-802 (1994).
68. See § 14-3-802 (1994).
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Georgia is not unique. Minority status, a designation of
individuals younger than age eighteen, confers a host of statutory
disabilities.69 Congress and the states selected eighteen-years as
the government voting age in their enactment and ratification of
the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Following
extensive hearings, both state and federal legislatures agreed to
give constitutional significance to age eighteen as the time when
young people should first participate in the most basic civic respon-
sibility of adults in a democracy. Eighteen also is the minimum age
at which the armed services may draft an individual as well as the
minimum age at which a person may enlist without parental
consent.
In most states and for most purposes, a "minor" means one
below age eighteen:7 °
All jurisdictions set the age of majority at age [eighteen] or
older. Forty-four jurisdictions set age [eighteen] as the age of
majority; two jurisdictions set the age of [twenty-one], three set
it at [nineteen], and two do not set a uniform age of majority..
. Forty-five jurisdictions require jurors to be [eighteen] years
or older, while three require jurors to be at least [nineteen]
years and three require jurors to be at least [twenty-one]....
No State has lowered its voting age below [eighteen].... All
jurisdictions but three require unemancipated minors to be
[eighteen] years old to marry without parental consent. In one
jurisdiction, the minimum age is [nineteen]; in one jurisdiction
the minimum age is [sixteen]; in another jurisdiction, females
may marry at age [fifteen] without parental consent ...
Thirty-seven jurisdictions establish [eighteen] as the age of
consent for most forms of non-emergency medical treatment;
one jurisdiction puts the age at [seventeen], one jurisdiction
puts the age at [sixteen], one sets the age at [fifteen], one
jurisdiction puts the age at [fourteen], two permit treatment if
the minor is able to understand the decision, and eight jurisdic-
tions have no legislation in this area.... Thirty-four jurisdic-
tions require a person to be age [eighteen] to receive a driver's
69. See generally Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for
Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 775-80
(1986). These legal disabilities are not without exceptions. The "emancipation" of a minor
- by marriage or enlistment in the armed services - may free a minor from the legal
disabilities prior to the actual date of his or her majority. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 62 (West
1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1996). Parental consent, however, is required for minors
to marry. The "mature minor" notion also permits a child to consent to medical treatment
if he or she is capable of appreciating its nature and consequences. E.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. §
20-9-602(7) (Michie 1987). Few jurisdictions, however, recognize this concept.
70. See National Legal Aid Brief, supra note 32, at 8.
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license without parental consent; four jurisdictions set the age
at [seventeen], while thirteen set it at [sixteen].... In forty-one
jurisdictions, a person must be age [eighteen] to purchase
pornographic materials; five jurisdictions set the age at [seven-
teen], one jurisdiction sets it at [sixteen], one sets it at [nine-
teen], one has simply outlawed obscenity by statute, one has no
specified minimum age, and one jurisdiction has no legislation
in this area.... Of the thirty-nine jurisdictions which permit
gambling, thirty-one set the minimum age at [eighteen], four
set it at [twenty-one], one sets it at [nineteen], one at [seven-
teen], and two at [sixteen].... Of the twenty-two jurisdictions
which set a minimum age for admission to pool halls, eighteen
jurisdictions put the age at [eighteen], three set the age at
[sixteen], and one puts it at [nineteen]. . . . Of the thirty
jurisdictions which set a minimum age for the right to pawn
property or to sell to junk or precious metal dealers, twenty-
seven set the age at [eighteen], while three set the age at
[sixteen] .
America's feeling toward child rapists is neither subtle nor
difficult to ascertain: we hate them. If the law will not punish them
severely enough for our satisfaction, then individual citizens might
well take matters into their own hands - and be hailed as heroes
for their vigilante actions. (Even on death row, pedophiles are
despised).72 If one social goal of capital punishment is to infuse the
citizenry with the sense that justice is dispensed to those criminals
who inspire our society's greatest outrage - with the corollary idea
that by imposing severe enough punishments, members of the law-
abiding majority population will feel less inclined to resort to
vigilante justice - then executing child rapists might further this
revenge-utilitarian goal of the death penalty.7 3
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. See DAvE VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD 48 (1995) (noting how
Arthur Frederick Goode was despised on death row).
73. For example, on September 8, 1997, a front-page news story in the Boston Globe,
titled Anger at Molesters, Courts Win Sympathy for Vigilantes, by Michael Grunwald,
reported:
DELAWARE, Ohio - The way Doc Bradley sees it, Rodney Hosler got lucky.
Sure, Hosler was abducted, tortured, and sodomized with a cucumber by his
wife, her mother, and her aunt. Sure, the woman scrawled "I am a child
molester" all over his body, then dumped him in his hometown, naked except
for a pink-and-green Minnie Mouse blanket.
But at least Hosler is alive. If he ever returns to Bradley's bar, now that
people know he abused his [five]-year-old stepdaughter, he might not be as
fortunate.
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I believe, however, that these cases will also present the Court
with far greater constitutional conundrums. Has the proportional-
ity reasoning of Coker withstood the test of time? Has American
culture circa 1997 rejected the idea that any rape of an adult
woman - no matter how aggravated, and no matter what the
circumstances - can never, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, be a crime sufficiently heinous, atrocious and cruel to warrant
death as an appropriate societal response? Should Coker v. Georgia
be overruled?
II. COKER V. GEORGIA: THE CASE, ITS ANTECEDENTS, AND ITS
SUCCESSORS
A. Proportionality Articulated: The Road to Coker v. Georgia
But the odd part, I never want to quit at least expecting
fairness. Even after all that's snagged me and mine, I want the
lack of "fair" to always shock me.74
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment," or, as the Court has put
it, forbids punishments that violate "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 5 In the
capital punishment context, the Eighth Amendment imposes both
procedural and substantive limits on the government's freedom to
decide who dies. Procedurally, the Constitution requires that the
death decision be lined with procedural safeguards to enhance the
"Those women are heroes in this town," said Bradley, a bushy-bearded
grandfather who used to serve drinks to Hosler. 'The only thing is, they
should've left their cucumber home and used a shotgun instead."
It sounds like a David Lynch version of 'Thelma and Louise," but Ohio's so-
called cucumber case is also a modern morality tale, a graphic display of
America's growing frustration with pedophiles. People are losing faith in the
justice system's ability to stop sexual predators from repeating their crimes, so
they can identify with these angry women who tried to do it themselves.
Hosler, 27, had to serve just 16 months in jail after pleading guilty to "gross
sexual imposition" in 1995. The overwhelming sentiment here is that he got a
more appropriate eye-for-an-eye punishment on July 26 from his wife, Jewel;
her mother, Mary Franks; and her aunt, Vickie Coulter.
"Those girls gave Rodney exactly what he deserved," said Lisa Gale, Hosler's
neighbor and co-worker. "Now he knows how it feels to be molested."
Michael Grunwald, Anger at Molesters, Courts Win Sympathy for Vigilantes, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1997, at Al.
74. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 19.
75. Trop v. Dullus, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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reliability of the capital punishment selection process. Substan-
tively, the Constitution excludes certain classes of people or crimes
from death eligibility. For example, execution of children or pick-
pockets would be disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional.
First, however, the Court had to decide whether execution of
any citizen for any crime was disproportionate - whether capital
punishment itself was "cruel or unusual" because it offended the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society."76
The United States Supreme Court's modern death penalty
jurisprudence began with McGautha v. California77 in 1971,
although pressure for a ruling on the constitutionality of the
penalty had been building for at least a decade." In that case the
defendant, Dennis McGautha, argued that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates standards to limit a
capital sentencer's discretion on the penalty issue. The Court
rejected McGautha's challenge, in part because development of such
standards would be impossible.8 0 Justice Harlan, writing for the
majority, reasoned that "to identify before the fact those character-
istics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the
death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language
which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.""1 Justice Harlan concluded that the "infinite variety of
cases and facets to each case would make general standards either
meaningless 'boiler plate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury
would need."8 2
A year later, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment forbade infliction of the death penalty under
statutes which leave a jury with undirected discretion over the
death decision. 3 The Furman holding, which resulted in vacated
death sentences for all 629 persons on death row nationally at the
time of the decision, 4 was handed down in a short per curiam
76. Id.
77. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
78. See generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973) (tracing pre-Furman litigation strategy of death penalty
abolitionists).
79. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183.
80. See id. at 196.
81. 402 U.S. at 204.
82. Id. at 208.
83. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
84. See Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 915 (1982).
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opinion that stated, without elaboration, that "the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in these cases [before the Court]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments."85 Each of the nine Justices wrote
separately, and no Justice in the five-person majority joined any
other.86 The individual opinions suggest, however, that the central
concern of the three crucial Justices was that the statutes at issue
in Furman lacked sentencing standards. Justice Douglas wrote
that "we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be
imprisoned."" Given this absence of guidance, it is not surprising
that the penalty is applied "selectively to minorities whose numbers
are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but
whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not counte-
nance general application of the same penalty across the board."8
Justice Stewart also stressed the randomness of the penalty:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual. For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed. 9
Justice White reached the same conclusion based on his experi-
ence as a Justice.90 Because Justice Brennan91 and Justice
Marshall92 would have declared the death penalty unconstitutional
per se, the "holding" of the case must be found in the opinions by
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White. The Court has in subse-
quent opinions noted that:
a fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in
Furman is that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body
on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human
life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
85. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
86. See Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (analyzing separate opinions).
87. 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 245.
89. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
90. See id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 257-306.
92. See id. at 314-71.
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directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action. 93
State legislatures, confronted with McGautha's statement that
the formulation of capital sentencing standards was impossible and
Furman's statement that unbridled sentencing discretion violated
the Eighth Amendment,9 4 set about redrafting their death penalty
statutes to conform with the Constitution. Florida was the first
state to do so, 95 and was later followed by Georgia. By 1976, thirty-
six jurisdictions had re-instituted the death penalty.96 The Florida
and Georgia statutes were similar. Both were "guided discretion"
statutes, designed to channel the sentencer's discretion by specify-
ing aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed in deciding
who dies. Most of the listed aggravating circumstances referred to
objectively ascertainable facts: whether the crime was committed
for pecuniary gain; whether the defendant was under sentence of
imprisonment at the time of the offense; whether a defendant had
a significant history of prior criminal history; and whether the
defendant was previously convicted of a felony.97
In Gregg v. Georgia, in 1976, the Court held the death penalty
was not excessive or disproportionate punishment as applied to the
crime of deliberate murder.9" In providing analytical content to the
facially vague phrase "the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society,"99 the court in Gregg crafted a
two-prong test. The first prong was an attempt to identify the
objective indicia of the evolving standards. These objective indicia
involved examining societal values as reflected in legislative
93. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189 (1976)).
94. The tension between McGautha and Furman was noted by the dissenters in Furman.
See 408 U.S. at 399 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
tension was also noted by several commentators. See, e.g., Polsby, supra note 86 at 1-4;
Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143-49 (1980); Ernest A. Renda, Note, The Bitter Fruit of
McGautha: Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for Weighing Method Articulation in Capital
Sentencing, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63, 63-64 (1982). See generally Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305.
95. See generally Charles H. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative
Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973); Tim
Thornton, Note, Florida's Legislative and Judicial Response to Furman v. Georgia: An
Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 108 (1974).
96. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23.
97. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166 n.9, with Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 n.6
(1976).
98. See 428 U.S. 153, 182-83, 186-87 (1976).
99. Trop v. Dullus, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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enactments, jury decisions, and lower court rulings.' ° The second
prong of Gregg's proportionality analysis was subjective. It required
the justices to determine whether the punishment at issue served
legitimate goals of punishment - principally retribution and
deterrence. 1o
Applying its two-prong test to the facts of Gregg, a majority of
the court held that capital punishment for the crime of intentional
murder found wide support among the objective indicia; it also
served the legitimate penological goals of retribution and deter-
rence. Thus, capital punishment for murder was not disproportion-
ate. It was constitutional, because it was proportionate.
One year after Gregg, the court applied the same two-prong
proportionality test to the crime of rape. In Coker v. Georgia, the
court held that execution for the "nonaggravated" rape of a sixteen-
year-old adult woman was unconstitutionally disproportionate. 102
B. Proportionality Reaffirmed: Coker v. Georgia
Anyhow, Marsden's losing Ned, his seeing what followed, it
changed so much in him. Even war's ending didn't switch that
around. When your appendix is gone, you've still got the scar
proving right where knives went in to find it. Something was
taken clear out of the child.' °3
If capital punishment for aggravated rape is ever appropriate,
Ehrlich Anthony Coker and his history of sexual terrorism seem to
make Coker a prime candidate. On December 5, 1971, Coker raped
and stabbed a young woman to death. Eight months later, he
kidnaped a sixteen-year-old girl, raped her twice, stripped her, beat
her with a club, and dragged her to a wooded area where he left her
for dead. He was caught, plead guilty to these offenses, and
received three life terms, two twenty-year terms, and one eight-year
term. These sentences were to run consecutively rather than
concurrently.
Approximately one and a half years later, on September 2,
1974, Coker and two other inmates escaped from the maximum
security prison where they were being held. At approximately
eleven o'clock that night, Coker entered the house of Allen and
Elnita Carver, waving a three-foot-long board over his head and
100. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
101. See id. at 183.
102. 433 U.S. 584 (1976).
103. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 19.
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threatening the couple. The Carvers were sixteen-year-olds. Mrs.
Carver had returned from the hospital after giving birth to her first
child only three weeks before. Coker forced Mrs. Carver to tie her
husband's hands and feet together and, after that was done, he tied
Mr. Carver to a shower rod in the bathroom. Coker then took Mr.
Carver's wallet and obtained a four-inch knife from the kitchen.
Putting a gag in Mr. Carver's mouth, Coker proceeded to rape Mrs.
Carver - in view of her husband. After raping her, Coker held the
knife to her and threatened to kill her if the police followed. With
Mrs. Carver beside him, Coker drove off in the Carvers' car. Mr.
Carver managed to free himself and call the police. A police search
ensued and Coker was found approximately ten minutes later.104
Coker was charged with armed robbery, rape, kidnaping, motor
vehicle theft, and escape. He was sentenced to death on the charge
of rape, life imprisonment for armed robbery, twenty years
imprisonment for kidnaping, seven years for motor vehicle theft,
and five years for escape. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction and the sentence of death.1 °5
The United States Supreme Court then heard the case to
determine whether a sentence of death for rape is a disproportion-
ate penalty. °6 The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
Georgia Supreme Court. The Court, went even further, however,
holding that the death penalty for rape is violative of the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause in that it is a
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
raping an adult woman. The Coker plurality discusses rape as a
serious crime, finding it:
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost
total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim. Short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of
self .... Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punish-
ment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the
person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death or even the serious injury
to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer;
104. See 433 U.S. 584, 587 (1976) (describing the facts of the case).
105. See id.
106. See generally David J. Karp, Note, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment
and the Death Penalty for Rape, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1714 (1978); Note, The Death Penalty for
Rape, 38 LA. L. REV. 868 (1978).
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for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have
the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is unique
in its severity and irrevocability... is an excessive penalty for
the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.
10 7
Reaffirming, clarifying, and applying Gregg's two-prong propor-
tionality analysis, a plurality of the Court in Coker held that capital
punishment was a disproportionate penalty for the rape of an adult
woman. Explaining the objective first prong, the Coker plurality
explained that line drawing here should be "informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent."' ' Objective indicia such
as legislative enactments and jury verdicts were the beginning of
proportionality analysis, but they were not the end. "[Tihe
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own [the Court's]
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptabil-
ity of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."' 9 Hence
the importance of the second prong. The court's independent
judgment is informed by "the two principal social purposes" of the
death penalty: retribution and deterrence."'
In Coker, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was
disproportionate for the crime of rape of a sixteen-year-old "adult"
woman. The Coker plurality acknowledged that the death penalty
might legitimately serve the goals of retribution and deterrence.
Based on a review of objective factors such as jury decisions and
state statutes, the Court held, however, that the "death penalty,
which is unique in its severity and irrevocability... is an excessive
penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.""'
C. Proportionality Post-Coker
When a beautiful house burns, remember its last great party."
2
While the proportionality cases immediately following Coker
reaffirmed the two-prong test of Coker and Gregg,"3 the most recent
Supreme Court cases have destabilized the doctrinal foundations of
107. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977).
108. Id. at 592.
109. Id. at 597; accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976).
110. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982).
111. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
112. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 231.
113. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99.
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the two-prong proportionality analysis articulated in Gregg, and
have reaffirmed and refined the analysis in Coker.114
In 1982, the Court decided Enmund v. Florida,"' where the
defendant, Enmund, had been the driver of the getaway car in the
robbery and murder of two elderly people. Enmund's accomplices
robbed and killed the elderly couple during the robbery, while
Enmund waited in the getaway car.11 6 The facts indicated that the
killings were not intended at the outset of the robbery, but the trial
court instructed the jury that Enmund could be found guilty of first
degree murder based upon the felony murder statute of Florida at
that time.1 7 The jury convicted Enmund of first degree murder and
sentenced him to death.
1 1 8
Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's
conviction and death sentence,"' finding that because Enmund was
a major participant in the felony, he was still responsible for the
death of the elderly couple. 2 °
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to
decide whether the imposition of the death penalty upon a non-
triggerman accomplice to a felony murder violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' 2 '
In a majority opinion written by Justice White,'22 the Court
reversed the Florida Supreme Court, holding that without a
showing that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill, the death penalty was disproportionate and therefore unconsti-
tutional. 2 '
The Court in Enmund utilized the proportionality review of
Gregg124 and Coker'25 by reviewing state statutes which provided an
objective indication of public attitudes towards the imposition of the
death penalty on a defendant like Enmund. 26 After reviewing the
114. Justice Scalia has argued that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportional
punishments. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-95 (1991).
115. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
116. See id. at 783.
117. See id. at 785.
118. See id.
119. See Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981).
120. See id. at 1369-70.
121. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
122. See id. Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 797.
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
125. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
126. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-93.
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state statutes, the Court concluded that only eight states would
allow the imposition of the death penalty on such a defendant. 121
The current legislative judgment, therefore, seemed to reject capital
punishment for Enmund's crime.'28
This evaluation of the current legislative judgment highlighted
what has continued to be a point of contention between the two
opposing sides on the United States Supreme Court. Depending
upon how one characterizes the defendant's culpable mental state,
as well as the defendant's degree of participation, one can assemble
or disassemble a configuration of states where the defendant may
or may not be subject to capital punishment. 129
Justice O'Connor concluded differently in her dissent, stating
that even without a showing of intent, twenty-three states would
impose the death penalty for a crime such as Enmund's. 3 ° Justice
O'Connor arrived at this number by taking Enmund's degree of
participation into account, as well as a possible finding that
Enmund had shown "extreme indifference to human life,"'' which
would therefore trigger additional statutes not included by the
majority. 13 2
Justice White, for the majority, surveyed jury decisions for
additional objective indicia of public attitudes about imposing
capital punishment on a defendant like Enmund.'33 The result
showed that out of 362 cases since 1954, juries had imposed death
upon a non-triggerman felony murder accomplice only six times.134
In addition, the Court found that for the previous twenty-five years,
no one convicted of felony murder who had not killed, attempted to
kill, or intended the death of the victim, had been executed. 3 '
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[t]he evidence is overwhelming
that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death
penalty for crimes such as [Enmund's]."136
127. See id. at 793.
128. See id.
129. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 822-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 170-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 822-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 822.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 794.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 796. Justice White stated, "The fact remains that we are not aware of a
single person convicted of a felony murder over the past quarter century who did not kill or
attempt to kill, and did not intend the death of the victim, who has been executed, and that
only three persons in that category are presently sentenced to die." Id.
136. Id. at 794.
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After making this objective inquiry of state and public indica-
tors, the Court engaged in the subjective review of Gregg'1 7 and
Coker 3' to decide whether the death penalty was excessive punish-
ment for the crime committed.'39 Comparing murder with robbery,
the Court stated that:
the focus must be on [Enmund's] culpability, not on that of
those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we
insist on "individualized consideration as a constitutional
requirement in imposing the death sentence," which means that
we must focus on "relevant facets of the character and record of
the individual offender."
140
Based on this comparison, and the requirement for individual-
ized consideration, the Court concluded that intentional harm must
be treated more severely than causing harm unintentionally"' To
treat Enmund, who did not kill or intend to kill, in the same man-
ner as his co-felons who did, was violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment. 
142
The Court also found that since those like Enmund had not
intended to kill, there would be little deterrence value in subjecting
Enmund to death.'43 The Court reasoned that the possibility of a
killing occurring during the course of a robbery is too small for
there to be any deterrence effect from imposing capital punishment
on those like Enmund.1
44
The Court also stated that the goal of retribution would not be
met because:
[p]utting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did
not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does
not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
that the criminal gets his just desserts .... Thus the Court
restricted retribution as a justification to those cases in which
individual culpability is specifically proven.
145
137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
139. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
140. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (citing Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978), Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 799.
144. See id.
145. Lilly Kling, Note, Constitutionalizing the Death Penalty for Accomplices to Felony
Murder, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 470 (1988) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
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Justice O'Connor, and the other dissenters, were very troubled
at what they regarded as an improper incorporation of an intent
requirement into Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.
146
The dissent, relying upon Weems v. United States,147 urged a
spectrum of culpability which would provide for the individualized
assessment of Lockett, 48 and at the same time allow determination
of the degree of the defendant's participation in the crime and a
determination of the defendant's awareness of a substantial risk of
death.1 49 Thus, the dissent would make intent one of several factors
to be evaluated at the trial level, to be weighed as an aggravating
or mitigating factor, and to be combined with the other relevant
factors.5 0 But intent, in the dissent's opinion, should not be
required as a matter of constitutional law.1
5 1
In 1978, two brothers, Ricky and Raymond Tison, smuggled
weapons into an Arizona prison, and helped their father and
another convicted murderer escape.' 52 Later, the group persuaded
a car carrying the Lyons family to pull over in the Arizona desert in
order to provide assistance to the Tisons. The Tison father and the
other escaped prisoner murdered the Lyons family.'53 There was no
evidence that either brother contemplated or intended the murders
to take place. 5 4 The record further shows that the brothers had in
fact gone to their car to get some water for the Lyons family
believing their father had decided to leave the Lyons family in the
desert and take the Lyons' car.'55 The brothers were later captured
in a shoot out with police, and their father escaped into the desert
where he died from exposure.
56
The Arizona trial judge found three statutory aggravating fac-
tors and no statutory mitigating factors, and sentenced the Tison
Brothers to death. 5 ' Upon appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court af-
firmed the death sentence despite finding that the Tison brothers
146. 'The Court's holding today is especially disturbing because it makes intent a matter
of federal constitutional law, requiring this Court both to review highly subjective
definitional problems customarily left to state criminal la and to develop an Eighth
Amendment meaning of intent." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 824 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
148. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
149. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 824.
150. See id. at 825.
151. See id. at 831.
152. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139-41 (1987).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 142.
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did not "specifically intend" the deaths and "did not actually pull
the trigger." '158 Despite these findings, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that the requirements of Enmund were satisfied because the
defendants could have anticipated the use of lethal force during the
felony.1
59
The United States Supreme Court held improper this charac-
terization of the Enmund requirement as a "species of foresee-
ability."'" The Court then enunciated a new standard which would
allow defendants such as Raymond and Ricky Tison to be put to
death. Despite the attempt by the Court to distinguish Tison from
Enmund, it is fairly clear that the Tison Court abandoned the
Enmund standard, and formulated a new standard."'
The Court attempted to point to factual differences between
Enmund and Tison. The Tisons brought weapons into the prison
and helped their father, a convicted murderer, escape while
Enmund waited in the getaway car.'62 The Tisons were present at
the killing and did nothing to stop it; Enmund was away from the
killing in the getaway car.'63 Based on this factual distinction, the
majority found that the Tisons' participation in the felony was
major, while Enmunds' only minor. 164
The Court found that the question of excessiveness and
culpability was not simply an either/or distinction for felony
murder. It was in fact a spectrum of many levels of participation
158. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633 P.2d 335, 354 (1981). 'This case, however, was
decided prior to Enmund, and following Enmund, the Tisons applied to the Arizona Supreme
Court for post-conviction relief." Tison, 48r U.S. at 162 (Brennan, J., dissenting). After
previously holding that the Tison brothers did not intend the killings to occur, the Arizona
Supreme Court attempted to fit the murders into the box prescribed by Enmund by defining
intent broadly enough to include the activities of the Tisons. According to the Arizona
definition, "[i]ntend [sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant intended,
contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used or that life would or
might be taken in accomplishing the underlying felony." Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder
and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1170 n.162 (1990)
(citing State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456, 690 P.2d 755, 757 (1984).
159. Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690 P.2d. at 757.
160. Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-51.
161. See Kling, supra note 145, at 477. See generally The Supreme Court, 1986 Term
Leading Cases, I. Constitutional Law, A. Criminal Law and Procedure, 3. Death Penalty -
Felony Murder, 101 HARV. L. REV. 138 (1987). Kathryn A. Watson, Tison v. Arizona: No
Intent Required for Death Penalty of Accomplice in Felony Murder, 10 CRIM. JUST. J. 167, 177
(1987). "At this point, the Court could simply have reversed the death sentences against the
Tison brothers in accordance with Enmund; however, the Court proceeded to create a
completely new substantive standard for capital liability." Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison
v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice are Broken, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 123, 140 (1989).
162. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-152.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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and culpability. At one end was Enmund, whose participation had
been minor, and at the other end was the felony murderer, who
actually pulled the trigger. The Tisons, the Court held, fell in
between at a level that showed "reckless indifference to human
life."'65 The Court held that "major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement."'66
The Court then gave cursory treatment to the proportionality
test set out in Coker,167 Gregg,16 and Enmund.6 9 Justice O'Connor
found that of the states imposing the death penalty, twenty-one
would allow the Tisons to be sentenced to death, while eleven would
not. 70 Justice O'Connor relied upon six jury decisions which she
used in conjunction with the state statutes to conclude that there
was an "apparent consensus that substantial participation in a vio-
lent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of inno-
cent human life may justify the death penalty even absent an
'intent to kill."
17
'
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan, cried foul at this
manipulation of the proportionality analysis, charging that the
majority had not included those jurisdictions which do not impose
capital punishment.'72 If these jurisdictions are included, the
dissent claimed, "the Court's view is itself distinctly the minority
position."'
7
Justice Brennan also criticized the basic failure of the major-
ity's proportionality analysis to explain why "major participation in
a felony with a state of mind of reckless indifference to human life
deserves the same punishment as intending to commit a murder or
actually committing a murder."'74 This basic questioning of the pro-
portionality analysis was the heart of Justice Brennan's dissent.
He stated that, "differential punishment of reckless and intentional
actions is ... essential if we are to retain 'the relation between
165. Id.at 151.
166. Id. at 158.
167. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
168. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
169. Enmund v. State, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
170. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 152-54.
171. Id. at 154.
172. See id. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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criminal liability and moral culpability' on which criminal justice
depends. 175
Justice Brennan also wondered what had happened to the
Court's assessment of whether imposing capital punishment for a
certain type of crime would further the goals of retribution and
deterrence. Somehow this step of the historical proportionality
analysis had escaped the majority's attention. 176
Two years after the Court decided Tison, it decided Stanford v.
Kentucky.177 Like Tison and Coker, Stanford was a proportionality
case. Specifically, the question presented in Stanford was whether
the Constitution forbids execution of people who were sixteen- or
seventeen-years-old at the time they committed their capital
crimes. Answering this question in the negative, the Stanford
Court followed the proportionality analysis of Tison rather than
Coker. Bean counting reigned supreme.'78
175. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134
(1965)).
176. See id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
178. Lower courts continue to cite Coker with approval as a proportionality case. E.g.,
House v. State, 696 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Gantorius v, State, 693 So. 2d
1040, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Kills on Top v. State, 928 P.2d 182, 198 (Mont. 1997;
Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147,
208 (Conn. 1996) (citing Coker for proposition that "death sentence for rape inherently
disproportionate"); State v. Jackson, 918 P.2d 1038, 1042 (Ariz. 1996) (citing Coker for
proposition that, "in invalidating the death penalty for rape of an adult woman, Court
stressed that Georgia was the only jurisdiction that authorized such a punishment'); State
v. Viree, 670 So. 2d 733, 736 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Logan v. State, 666 So. 2d 260, 260 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Thomas v. State, 916 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State v.
Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1995); State v. Dunban, 657 So. 2d 429, 935 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Robertson v. State, 888 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Martini, 651
A.2d 949, 957 (N.J. 1994); People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 604 (Cal. 1994); Ex parte Woodward,
631 So. 2d 1065, 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Coker for proposition that "the death
penalty is constitutionally excessive punishment for rape'); James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668,
670 (Fla. 1993) (dissent); People v. Escobar, 837 P.2d 1100 (Cal. 1992); State v. Marshall, 613
A.2d 1059, 1068, (N.J. 1992) (citing Coker as "declaring death sentence disproportionate for
crime of rape"); Ormond v. State, 599 So. 2d 951, 953 n.1 (Miss. 1992) (citing Coker for
proposition that "because of disproportionality and excessiveness of punishment, [E]ighth
[A]mendment forbids death sentence for crime of rape of adult woman'); State v. Hood, 584
So. 2d 1238, 1241 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 190 (Tenn. 1991)
(citing Coker for proposition that "death may be disproportionate per se when the offense
does not involve the death of the victim"); Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 190 (Fla. 1991)
(citing Coker as "holding the death penalty disproportional to the crime of rape'); Sanders
v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 135 (Del. 1990) (citing Coker as holding "unconstitutional to execute
the defendant convicted of rape"); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990); People v. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1990); State v. Jesus, 565 So. 2d 1361,
1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. 1990); State v.
Glenn, 558 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1990) (citing Coker for proposition that "death penalty
inappropriate in rape cases"); State v. Conway, 556 So. 2d 1323, 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
("Coker... held that a death sentence for rape is excessive punishment under the Eighth
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By focusing their proportionality analysis exclusively on
legislative enactments, the TiMon and Stanford Courts abdicated
their duty to undertake an independent judicial review of the
penological justifications for the legislative decisions to extend
capital punishment to include particular classes of crimes or
criminals. By deferring entirely to the elected legislatures, the
federal judiciary renders itself powerless to act as a counterweight
to the political pressures that very often drive legislative
decisionmaking on matters of capital punishment at this moment
in American history.' 9 Anyone who has been closely involved with
the legislative politics of death - as I was, in Florida during the
mid-1980s - must acknowledge the primary role of electoral
politics as a driving force in legislative decisionmaking in this
context.
This judicial abdication would be especially unfortunate in the
case of capital punishment for the crime of rape. It would require
the Supreme Court to ignore the very real policy arguments that
capital punishment for rape would not well serve the penological
goals of capital punishment specifically and the criminal law
generally. For example, making rape itself a capital crime might
have the unintended consequence of increasing the likelihood that
rapes will end with the murder of the rape victim. If rape is a
noncapital crime, while murder is a capital crime, then rapists have
an incentive not to kill the victim to eliminate a witnesses to their
crimes. If rape itself is capital, however, then the incentive calculus
shifts significantly. The calculating criminal, engaging in a risk-
benefit analysis, might well cooly calculate as follows: "Since the
rape itself makes me death-eligible, I don't have much to lose by
Amendment.'); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 263 (W. Va. 1989) (citing Coker for
proposition that "a death sentence for the crime of rape does violate the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment'); State v. Walker, 540 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing that "[iln Coker... the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in an
aggravated rape conviction noting that the punishment did not match the crime."); State v.
Keith, 754 P.2d 474, 482 (Mont. 1988) (citing Coker for proposition that "capital punishment
is excessive and therefore unconstitutional if imposed for the charge of rape alone"); People
v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167, 1174 (1ll. 1988); Trevino v. State, 739 P.2d 1019, 1022 n.1 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1987); State v. Hernandez, 528 A.2d 794, 800 (Conn. 1987); State v. Ramseur, 524
A.2d 188, 213 (N.J. 1987).
179. On the judicial politics of capital punishment, see generally Stephen B. Bright &
Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760-65 (1995);
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in
American Politics, 18 N.Y.C. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711 (1990-91); Paul Reidinger, The
Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52; Gerald F. Uelman, Review of Death Penalty
Judgments, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237 (1989); Stephen P. Garvy, Politicizing Who Dies, 101
YALE L.J. 187 (1991); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239
(1994).
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killing my rape victim, and I have everything to gain by eliminating
a powerful witness against me at my trial."
Legislators, as well as life-tenured Supreme Court justices, can
and should take these policy matters into consideration. Assuming,
however, that legislators do - as the Tison and Stanford Courts
seem to require - ignores the palpable reality of the politics of
death that drive legislative decisionmaking when it comes to capital
punishment. If this is federalism, then it is ostrich federalism.
Still, in light of Stanford and Tison, the linchpin of the
proportionality analysis is the survey of legislative activity - what
I call legislative bean counting. As I will now discuss, on the matter
of bean counting, Coker is especially vulnerable.
180
III. DECONSTRUCTING COKER
One thinks of Novalis' advice, highly applicable in light of our.
Confederate topic: "After losing a war, one should only write
comedies."18'
The reasoning of the Coker opinion itself is flawed in three
respects - two concerning what the opinion said, and the third
concerning what the opinion didn't say. First, the Coker opinion's
bean counting of the objective indicia of the evolving standards of
decency erroneously focused on legislative enactments circa 1977,
disregarding the chilling effect of Furman's uncertain commands on
the willingness of reasonably risk-averse state legislatures to enact
capital rape statutes. Second, the Coker Court's minimization of
the harm inflicted upon the victims of rape. Third, the Coker
Court's failure to engage the issue of the long history of racism in
America's experience with the crime of capital rape. 82
180. Coker is also vulnerable because it was a plurality rather than a majority opinion. In
any event, the current Supreme Court is not shy about overruling precedent in capital cases
with which it disagrees. Compare Booth v. Maryland, 116 S. Ct. 251 (1995), cert. denied, and
Gathers v. South Carolina, 369 S.E.2d. 140 (1988), with Payne v. Tennessee, 791 S.W.2d 10
(1990).
181. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 228.
182. Commentators have noted the Coker Court's skirting of the social science research
showing capital punishment for rape to be discriminatorily applied. See e.g., Dennis Dorin,
Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justices and Racial Discrimination in the Imposition
of Capital Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1667 (1981).
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A. Counting the Wrong Beans?
It is inconceivable what noise and bloodshed might break
upon us in first light .... I feel myself becoming half-accom-
plished at it [war]. There are many things we should all
remain quite bad at. 8'
The Court in Gregg explained that "[t]he most marked indica-
tion of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the
legislative response to Furman."'184 Justice White's opinion for the
Coker Court focused on bean-counting of objective indicia, and the
beans that counted most for him were those prevailing in 1977, the
year Coker was decided.
"In 1926, twenty American jurisdictions (eighteen States, the
federal government, and the District of Columbia) provided the
death penalty as a possible punishment for the rape of an adult
female."' 5 The Coker Court wrote that in "no time in the last [fifty]
years have a majority of the States authorized death as a punish-
ment for rape."' 6
Following Furman, thirty-five states enacted new capital
statutes. None of the states that had not authorized capital
punishment for rape prior to Furman did so immediately post-
Furman.i8 7 Of the sixteen states that made rape a capital offense
at the time of Furman, only three - Georgia, North Carolina and
Louisiana - authorized the death penalty for rape of an adult
woman in their revised statutes, 8' although three other states did
make rape of a child a capital crime.'89 The mandatory-death
capital statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana, however, were
invalidated in 1976. When Louisiana and North Carolina revised
their statutes again, both states abandoned authorization of the
death penalty for rape. 9 °
183. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 30.
184. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976).
185. Brief for Petitioner at 38-39, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
186. 433 U.S. at 593.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 594.
189. Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 194, at 39-40.
Florida's post-Furman statute defined two "capital felonies": First degree murder and sexual
battery committed by a defendant eighteen years of age or older upon a child, eleven years
of age or younger. See Brief for Petitioner at 31 n.14, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(No. 75-5706).
190. This bean counting maneuver is a bit disingenuous by the Coker plurality. If the goal
of bean counting is to objectify the nation's "evolving standards of decency," then what
matters is that these state legislatures enacted statutes authorizing death for rapists of adult
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Thus, according to the Coker plurality, in 1977 Georgia stood
alone as the only post-Furman state to authorize capital punish-
ment for rape of an adult woman. That was enough for the Court.
The Court found the objective evidence that Georgia was out of step
with the other states "obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman.""'9
"Obviously." When courts in capital cases use words like
"obviously," beware. Here, the Coker Court's isolation of Georgia
was something of a judicial sleight of hand. The State of Georgia
argued:
The petitioner makes his strongest and most forceful
argument when he asserts that the "minuscule" number of
states making rape a capital crime in the wake of Furman v.
Georgia, is evidence of the contemporary repudiation of death
as a punishment for rape. But the petitioner's argument
necessarily assumes that the post-Furman enactments resulted
from a societal rejection of death as a punishment for rape and
not from Furman itself. For this reason, the argument is flawed.
The legislative reaction to Furman can perhaps best be
described as being as diverse as the concurring opinions that
made the majority.... Of the sixteen states that punished rape
as a capital crime prior to Furman, eleven later enacted general
capital punishment statutes that are at least arguably suspect
in light of Woodson v. North Carolina.
Rape, as a class of crime, is no doubt generally viewed as
less serious than murder. Thus, it is not surprising that those
states opting for so-called mandatory statutes eliminated rape
as a capital crime entirely or else retained rape as a capital
crime in only narrow circumstances. About all that can be said
about the legislatures that enacted these statutes is that they
apparently read Furman as requiring mandatory sentencing;
given a choice between executing all rapists and executing none,
or almost none, the legislatures opted for executing none. The
choice says little in terms of society suddenly rejecting the death
penalty for rape .... For similar reasons, those legislatures
enacting discretionary statutes, but eliminating rape as a
capital crime, likely perceived that Furman required a narrow-
ing of the overall process whereby some offenders are sentenced
women - not that those legislative enactments were subsequently held not to pass
constitutional muster under the uncertain commands of Furman v. Georgia. this Coker
sleight of hand suggests the perils of bean counting as a method of constitutional
adjudication.
191. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
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to death and others, convicted of similarly defined crimes, are
not. That some states may have narrowed the definitions of
crimes more than was constitutionally necessary, and elimi-
nated some crimes entirely, tells us little about societal rejec-
tion of death as a punishment for rape.
The varied legislative responses to Furman are hardly an
accurate assessment of contemporary standards as they pertain
to rape. An examination of the legislative enactments existing
at the time of the Furman decision would no doubt provide a
more reliable assessment; after all, the standard had remained
relatively constant for fifty years.
In terms of his reliance on statutes that presently sanction
the death penalty for rape, the petitioner has overstated his
contemporary standards argument. The legislative response to
Furman is simply no basis upon which to conclude that contem-
porary society rejects death as a punishment for all rapes.192
192. Brief for Respondent at 18-20, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444).
In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned:
Since Coker, only Florida's statute has been invalidated under its reasoning.
Mississippi's statute and Tennessee's statute were invalidated for infirmities
in the statute or sentencing schemes of their respective states. While Louisiana
remains the sole jurisdiction with such a statute in effect, it does not do so
without the suggestion of some trend or suggestion from several other states
that their citizens desire the death penalty for such a heinous crime.
The Coker Court took into account the recent past in considering what society
deems to be cruel and unusual punishment. Coker, supra at 614 (Powell,J.,
dissenting). We cannot look solely at what the legislatures have refrained from
doing under conditions of great uncertainty arising from the Supreme Court's
"less than lucid holdings on the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 614. The fact that
Louisiana is presently the sole state allowing the death penalty for the rape of
a child is not conclusive. There is no constitutional infirmity in a state's statute
simply because that jurisdiction chose to be first. Statutes applied in one state
can be carefully watched by other states so that the experience of the first state
becomes available to all other states. Coker, supra at 616 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). That one State is "presently a minority does not, in my view, make
[its] judgment less worthy of deference. Our concern for human life must not
be confined to the guilty; a state legislature is not to be thought insensitive to
human values because it acts firmly to protect the lives and related values of
the innocent." Id. The needs and standards of society change, and these
changes are a result of experience and knowledge. If no state could pass a law
without other states passing the same or similar law, new laws could never be
passed. To make this the controlling factor leads only to absurd results. Some
suggest that it has been over a year since Louisiana has amended its law to per-
mit the death penalty for the rape of a child, and that no other state has follow-
ed suit. Since its enactment, the statute has been under constant scrutiny. It
is quite possible that other states are awaiting the outcome of the challenges to
the constitutionality of the subject statute before enacting their own.
State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996).
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There is some strength to this contention. The problem with
Coker's bean counting was that it counted the wrong beans - or it
counted the right beans at the wrong time. By focusing on legisla-
tive enactments in 1977, post-Furman, the Court failed to account
for the chilling effect that Furman doubtlessly had on the willing-
ness to enact capital statutes for crimes other than murder. After
all, it was not even clear from the Furman opinions that capital
punishment for murder was constitutional. By constricting its
temporal frame of reference to 1977, rather than 1971 or earlier,
the Coker Court warped its own survey of the legislative indicia
concerning the proportionality of capital punishment for rape.
"What, then [were] the capital offenses in America. . . before
the U.S. Supreme Court's Furman decision of June 1972 effectively
abolished existing capital statutes?"' 93 Hugo Bedau's tabulation of
crimes in the United States for which death was an available
punishment, as of January 1967 in fifty-five jurisdictions (the fifty
states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands,
and federal civil and military authority), found that rape was
punishable by death in nineteen jurisdictions.' 94 By 1971, the year
before Furman, that number had dropped to sixteen.' 95 Statutes
authorizing death for rapists were concentrated in the sixteen
southern states: "[Fourteen] of the [eighteen] capital jurisdictions
and [twenty-seven] of the [thirty-three] capital [statutory] provi-
sions were in the south. All eight of the southwestern and border
states had the death penalty for rape."'96
These objective indicia were not limited to capital punishment
for rapists and were not abstract. American law did not simply
authorize capital punishment for rapists; it also sentenced people
to death for rape, and executed them. Since "1930 capital punish-
ment has been widely used only for homicide and rape . ...
[E]ighteen .... death penalty jurisdictions for rape have executed
rapists. By contrast, very few jurisdictions have actually executed
offenders for any [other] crimes."'97 Bedau wrote in 1987 that "[a]s
recently as the end of World War II in the southern states as many
as 20 percent (of executions) each year were for rape. Executions
occurred nationally at the rate of ten each month.' 98
193. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGALHOMICIDE: DEATHAS PUNISHMENT INAMERICA, 1864-1982,
at 32 (1984).
194. See id. at 33 tbl. 1-7.
195. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
196. BOWERS, supra note 193, at 35.
197. Id. at 34.
198. HUGO BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 131 (1987).
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In the world following Furman's 1972 constitutional earth-
quake, state legislatures were understandably risk-averse in re-
enacting capital statutes for murder.'99 It was far from clear that,
if capital punishment was constitutional at all, it was constitutional
for the crime of murder. Not until 1976 did the Court put its
constitutional seal of approval on the death penalty for murder. One
year later, in Coker, the court threw out capital punishment for
rape. In the face of Coker's holding, state legislatures have been
reluctant to enact new statutes authorizing death for rapists. If
Furman had a chilling effect on state legislatures' enacting rape
statutes, Coker's effect was more like deep freeze.
Still, notwithstanding Coker's brooding omnipresence, as of
August 1997 at least two jurisdictions, Louisiana and Georgia,
authorized capital punishment for the forcible rape of a child.2"' In
a different factual context - the jury override - the Supreme
Court has held that three states are enough.20 '
Two out of thirty-eight jurisdictions is not impressive objective
indicia that our "evolving standards of decency' 20 2 condone execut-
ing rapists. If the field of vision, however, is expanded to include
statutes authorizing death for all nonhomicide crimes, including
rape, the bean counting looks a bit different. As of 1993, there were
thirty-six capital punishment states in the United States. Of these
thirty-six, at least six authorized death for non-homicides ranging
from aircraft hijacking, treason, attempted murder, kidnaping with
gross permanent physical injury inflicted on the victim, and rape of
a child. 20 3 By 1997 that number had jumped to fourteen - more
199. In Florida, the legislative risk-aversion to tinkering with a capital statute that has
already passed Constitutional muster is captured in the phrase, "If it ain't broken, don't fix
it." Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death
Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 68 & n.176 (1985).
200. See Higgins, supra note 7. In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court wrote:
Another body of people play a role in determining the contemporary standards
of our society. That body is the juries who make the determination of whether
a certain defendant deserves the death penalty for his particular crime. The
Coker Court concluded that "in the vast majority of [rape] cases, at least 9 out
of 10, juries have not imposed the death sentence." Coker, supra at 596-597, 97
S. Ct. at 2868-2869. However, in drawing this conclusion, the Court does not
say whether these rape cases were the rape of an adult or of a child. Moreover,
the reluctance of the juries to impose the death penalty may reflect the humane
feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for extreme
cases. Furman, supra at 388, 92 S. Ct. at 2803. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996).
201. See Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
202. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
203. See HUGO BEDAU, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 37 tbl. 2-1 (Hugo Bedau ed.,
4th ed. 1997).
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204than doubling in only four years. Those fourteen jurisdictionswere, according to the ABA Journal:
Arkansas: treason; California: treason; Colorado: kidnaping
where victim is harmed, treason; Florida: drug trafficking;
Georgia: aircraft hijacking, treason, rape of children; Idaho:
kidnaping where victim is harmed; Illinois: treason, aggravated
kidnaping for ransom; Louisiana: treason, rape of child under
12; Mississippi: treason, aircraft piracy; Missouri: several
felonies including treason, drug dealing near schools;
Montana: aggravated assault or kidnaping by a person in state
prison for murder or persistent felonies; New Mexico: espio-
nage; Washington: treason; Federal government: treason, drug
dealing by a drug kingpin who heads a drug business...
Further, our national legislature has evidenced, under the
leadership of President Clinton, an attitude receptive to extending
the federal death penalty to include nonhomicides. The 1994
Federal Death Penalty Act created two such new federal capital
crimes: Drug trafficking in large quantities, even if no death
results, and attempting, authorizing or advising the killing of any
public officer, regardless whether such a killing actually occurs.20 6
Viewed in rarefied isolation, these figures might not appear to
be sufficient objective indicia that our standards of decency have
not rejected capital punishment for rape. When viewed, however,
in the atmospheric context of Coker's chilling effect on legislative
enactment of such statutes, the numbers, and the trend of their
increase, might be enough to persuade the Rehnquist/Thomas/
Scalia Court that no national consensus exists for the proposition
that death is a "grossly disproportionate"2 °7 societal response to the
crime of aggravated rape.
B. It's Only Rape: Rape as "A Crime of Patriarchy""20
You know how some doctors say a person can't remember pain
from one hurt to the next? Ha. For pain, I got a photogenic
memory.2 °9
204. See Higgins, supra note 7.
205. Id.
206. See DEATH PENALTY, supra note 203, at 39 tbl. 2-12.
207. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
208. JUDITH BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 244 (1991).
209. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 199.
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Mrs. Carver [the victim] was unharmed.21 °
In a brilliant amicus brief on behalf of NOW, other women's
groups, and the ACLU, Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued:
I. The death penalty for rape should be rejected as a vestige of
an ancient, patriarchal system in which women were viewed
both as the property of men and as entitled to a crippling
"chivalric protection." It is part of the fabric of laws and
enforcement practices surrounding rape which in fact hamper
prosecution and convictions for that crime, thus leaving women
with little real protection against rape.21'
II. The death sentence for rape is impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment because it does not meet "contemporary
standards regarding the infliction of punishment" and is
inadvisable since it diminishes legal protection afforded rape
victims.212
Amici proffered persuasive arguments opposing the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman. Arguing that the death
penalty was a disincentive to treating rape seriously, amici
suggested that the Court find the death penalty for rape to be
unconstitutional. Amici traced the history of the death penalty for
rape and informed the Court that the penalty was an anachronism,
bound up in sexist notions of women as the property of men.
The Court ignored amici's arguments. Although it reached the
desired result regarding the inappropriateness of capital punish-
ment for rape, its opinion failed to take into account the reality of
rape. Rather, the Supreme Court decided Coker as if it were "just
another" death penalty case. By rendering its decision from the
inside of a self-created doctrinal box, the Court exposed its own
sexism.
All nine men who wrote or joined in opinions in Coker pur-
ported to recognize the seriousness of rape as a crime. Justice
White wrote that the Court did not discount the "seriousness of
rape as a crime." '213 He explained that the Court appreciated that
rape violated the victim's personal integrity and autonomy. He
210. Coker, 433 U.S. at 587 (plurality opinion written by J. Byron White).
211. Brief for Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, The Center for
Constitutional Rights, The National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education
Fund, The Women's Law Project, The Center for Women Policy Studies, The Women's Legal
Defense Fund, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. at 11, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(No. 75-5444) [hereinafter ACLU Amici].
212. Id. at 22.
213. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
EXECUTING RAPISTS
expressed the Court's understanding of rape as "a violent crime
because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimida-
tion, to overcome the will and the capacity of the victim to resist,"'214
and he added that rape also undermines "the community's sense of
security." '215 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that death is an
excessive penalty for a rape that is not accompanied by murder.
21 6
Justice Brennan, adhering to his view that the death penalty
is per se cruel and unusual punishment,217 concurred in the Coker
ruling that the death penalty for rape is excessive.218 Justice
Marshall also concurred in the Coker judgment and referred to his
opinion in Furman.1 9 In Furman, Justice Marshall discussed
evidence of racial discrimination in capital sentencing of convicted
rapists. He found that "capital punishment is imposed discri-
minatorily against certain identifiable classes of people. 22° With
regard to executions for rape, Justice Marshall noted that of the 455
persons executed for rape between 1930-1968, forty-eight men were
white and 405 men were black. 22' He concluded that "[i]t is the
poor, and the members of minority groups who are least able to
voice their complaints against capital punishment. Their impotence
leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, better-
represented, just-as-guilty person can escape. 2 22 He con-tinued to
support that view in Coker.
Justice Powell concurred in the Coker judgment as to the facts
of the case and supported the view that "ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman."223 He did not, however, join in the majority's view that the
death penalty was excessive punishment for the crime of rape in all
cases. Rather, Justice Powell explained that there were "extreme
variations ' 224 in types of rapes, as well as "extreme variation in the
'degree of culpability of rapists.' ,,2 5 He concluded that, although "it
is not the Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that
might distinguish aggravated rape from the more usual case," the
214. Id.
215. Id. at 598.
216. See id. at 599, 600.
217. See generally MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (1996).
218. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring).
219. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
220. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
221. See id.
222. Id. at 366.
223. Coker, 433 U.S. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 603 (quoting Snider v. Reyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (4th Cir. 1966)).
225. Id.
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death penalty indeed might be warranted in some cases of rape, but
not others.226
Finally, for Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
federalism was the primary objection to the Coker ruling. The
dissent accepted the proposition that the Eighth Amendment bars
imposition of the death penalty for minor crimes, but they professed
that rape was not a minor crime. Consequently, the dissent
believed that the State of Georgia should punish Coker in whatever
manner it deemed effective for the crime of rape.
The dissent was particularly troubled by the nature of Anthony
Coker's crime and by his record. After describing two previous
rapes and a murder for which Coker was serving a life term, the
dissent described the present crime. Chief Justice Burger was
especially troubled because Coker raped "Mrs. Carver" in the
presence of her husband.227 The defendant was fairly portrayed in
the dissent as a depraved human being who "by his life pattern..
has shown that he presents a particular danger to the safety,
welfare and chastity of women .... 228
The dissent rejected Justice Powell's "bifurcation of rape into
categories of harmful and non-harmful. 229 Instead, foreshadowing
a generation of feminist scholarship, the dissent characterized rape
as inherently brutal. Referring to the facts of the case, Chief
Justice Burger asked, "Can any Member of the Court state with
confidence that a [sixteen]-year-old woman who is raped in the
presence of her husband three weeks after giving birth to a baby
sustained [no] ... injury 230 Agreeing with the majority that rape
causes more than physical harm, Chief Justice Burger commented,
"Rape is not a mere physical attack - it is destructive of the human
personality. The remainder of the victim's life may be gravely
affected, and in turn may have a serious detrimental effect upon
her husband and any children she may have. 231
Spurning the Court's sweeping rejection of the death penalty
for all rapes, the dissent reflected:
The question of whether the death penalty is an appropriate
punishment for rape is surely an open one. It is arguable that
many prospective rapists would be deterred by the possibility
that they could suffer death for their offense; it is also arguable
226. Id. at 602 n.1, 603.
227. See id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 606.
229. Id. at 608 n.2.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 612.
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that the death penalty would have only minimal deterrent
effect. It may well be that rape victims would become more
willing to report the crime and aid in the apprehension of the
criminals if they knew that community disapproval of rapists
was sufficiently strong to inflict the extreme penalty.... Quite
possibly, the occasional, well publicized execution of egregious
rapists may cause citizens to feel greater security in their daily
lives.... "
But the times they were a changin'. In 1975, two years before
Coker was decided, Susan Brownmiller published a book entitled
Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape.2 3 Brownmiller's book,
although not without its own flaws and exaggerations, was
responsible, more than any other single event, for sparking a
transformation of American culture's consciousness about the
seriousness and pervasiveness of rape. Judith Baer was not
exaggerating when she wrote in 1991 that, in recent years, "[n]ot
only has the law's basic approach to the crime of rape changed, but
social attitudes could hardly be more different now from what they
were fifty years ago .... Much of the credit for this success belongs
to one author, Susan Brownmiller, and one book, Against Our
Will. , 234
Building on Brownmiller's work, feminist legal scholars like
Susan Estrich,235 Catharine MacKinnon,2 36 Judith Baer,23 ' Deborah
Rhode2 3' and others,239 have demonstrated, convincingly, that the
American legal system has historically and systematically mini-
mized the seriousness of rape, in part by characterizing rape
between strangers as "real rape," rape in the true sense, while
dismissing rapes between all other persons as less serious.
232. Id. at 617.
233. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
234. BAER, supra note 208, at 244.
235. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
236. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81 (1987).
237. See BAER, supra note 208, at 244-586.
238. See DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND JUSTICE 244-52 (1989).
239. See generally LORENNE CLARK & DEBRA LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE
SEXUALITY (1977); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR,
SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA (1976); SUSAN GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE
POLITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1986); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 171-83 (1989); ANDREA MEDEA & KATHLEEN THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE (1974);
KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 44, 184, 335 (1970); DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE
(1982); DIANA RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (1975); CAROL
SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 26-49 (1989); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087 (1986).
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Rape was punishable by death as far back as ancient
Babylonia. As a crime against a man's property, rape had to be
dealt with severely. According to Brownmiller, rape was "the theft
of virginity, an embezzlement of... (the woman's) fair price on the
market. 2 4' Death was viewed as the appropriate penalty because
rape was a crime against men and a crime against the chastity of
women.
This attitude carried over into Western law. According to amici
filed before the Supreme Court in Coker, "[t]he death penalty as a
potential sanction for rape is part of the fabric of laws and enforce-
ment patterns based on obsolete and demeaning notions about
women which inevitably yields lack of enforcement of rape laws,
rather than protection of women. 241
States which had authorized the death penalty for rape,
justified the sanction by claiming it was for the protection of
women. A review of the impact of the death penalty for rape re-
veals that instead, capital punishment served as a symbol of white
man's outrage over the defilement of their property. This property
tradition was especially evident in Southern death penalty states.
History points to the inescapable truth that the death penalty
for rape was imposed disproportionately against black men. Black
men who raped white women, the sexual property of white men,
were responsible in the law's eyes for devaluing the worth of the
white men's sexual possession. In fact, only white men were
exempt from the death penalty for the rape of a white woman in the
pre-Civil War South. The double standard was codified in Georgia
law until a year after the abolition of slavery.2 42 Before 1861, the
Georgia penal code expressly provided that rape committed by
white men would be punished by a maximum prison term of twenty
years, while slaves and "free persons of color" were to be put to
death for the rape of free white women.2 43
Although facially neutral statutes were enacted during
Reconstruction, imposition of the death penalty for rape continued
to fall disproportionately to black men convicted of raping white
women.2 44 Only Justice Marshall faced the reality of racism in his
Furman concurrence (later reaffirmed in Coker) by proffering
statistics which showed that of 455 men executed for rape between
1930-1968, forty-eight were white and 405 were black.
240. BROWNMILLER, supra note 233, at 18.
241. ACLU Amici, supra note 211, at 8-9.
242. See generally id.
243. See generally id.
244. See id.
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Moreover, in the South, the worth of a white woman was
determined by her purity.24 Southern rape law emphasized the
importance of chastity. In Camp v. State, a nineteenth-century
case, a Georgia court proclaimed that rape of a virgin, "the citadel
of whose character is virtue" is the ultimate degradation.2 46 Fully
a century later, another Georgia court upheld the death penalty for
rape as "necessary for the protection of the mothers of mankind"24 7
from "the forcible sexual invasion of her body, the temple of her
soul, thereby soiling for life her purity, the most precious attribute
of all mankind." '248 In 1977 in Coker, Chief Justice Burger, in
advocating the death penalty for rape, described the defendant as
a depraved human being who "presents a particular danger to the
... chastity of women."
249
Coker is inseparable from matters of sex and gender - those
characteristics imposed upon biological sex by acculturation and
socialization. Gender is a complex amalgam of meanings which
society creates and attaches to biological sex. Gender is usually
spoken of by researchers and theorists as socially constructed, not
biologically determined. 2 0  This is because maleness is the one
obvious trait shared by virtually all known capital rapists.
"Feminism" is not monolithic, and it never has been. New
dissenting voices Katie Roiphe, Rene Denfeld, Camille Paglia, and
Christine Hoff Sommers have joined the debate with long-time
critics like Midge Decter.25' Cogent criticisms of "feminism" and
feminist scholarship notwithstanding, any intelligible discussion of
245. See id. (noting also that the South did not even recognize the rape of black women
slaves by their masters because they were already the latter's property, an interesting and
disturbing analogy to the marital rape exemption).
246. 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847).
247. Sims v. Balkom, 220 Ga. 7, 10, 136 S.E.2d. 766, 769 (1964).
248. Id. at 11.
249. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 606 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
250. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990); GAYLE RUBIN, THINKING SEX: NOTES FOR A RADICAL THEORY OF THE POLITICS
OF SEXUALITY, IN PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance
ed. 1984); see also RUTH BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER (1984); LAURIE DAVIDSON & LAURA
KRAMER GORDON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 1-33 (1979); SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX 1-47 (1953); See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER (1985);
EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985); SUZANNE KESSLER &
WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER (1978).
251. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, Feminism's Identity Crisis, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1993, at 51; see
also KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER (1993); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE
FEMINISM? (1994); RENE DENFELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS (1995); CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART,
AND AMERICAN CULTURE (1992); MIDGE DECTER, THE NEW CHASTITY AND OTHER ARGUMENTS
AGAINST WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1972); MIDGE DECTER, THE LIBERATED WOMAN AND OTHER
AMERICANS (1971).
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sexual murder or serial murder25 must bring questions of gender
to the forefront. Traditional literature on the topic all but ignores
gender. Disregarding gender buries the most salient issue of who
is doing the raping - and the killing - and who is doing the dying.
First and most important, only such scholarship recognizes the
centrality of gender to any meaningful inquiry into serial sexual
murder. To ignore or minimize gender, as virtually all traditional
scholarship in this area does, disregards the critical point of who is
raping whom.
Further, feminist scholarship at its best is useful because it
tends to be interdisciplinary and inclusive rather than insular.
Cameron and Frazer, for example, wrote:
One further sign of our commitment to feminism is the con-
sciously interdisciplinary focus of The Lust to Kill and the fact
that we have felt able to venture into academic territory where
we have no special claims to expertise. Feminists are notorious
for not respecting the "proper" boundaries of academic disci-
plines, and in our opinion that is all to the good.253
Feminist learning typically employs gender as a fundamental
organizing category of human experience, stressing that men and
women have different perceptions or experiences in the same
contexts - the male perspective having been dominant if not
exclusive in fields of knowledge. Feminism further stresses that
gender is not a natural biological fact but a social construct, a
learned quality, an assigned status, which is therefore subject to
identification by humanistic disciplines. Some poststructuralists,
reacting to liberal feminism's focus on the experiences of white,
middle class, heterosexual women, question the preeminence of
gender. They posit that there is no essential womanness: "no
woman but many women." 54 These writers appear not to reject
gender as a frame of reference. They claim instead that gender
cannot be understood in isolation; experiences based on gender
cannot be separated from experiences based on race, class, sexual
252. See, e.g., ROBERT RESSLER ET AL., SEXUAL HOMICIDE: PATTERNS AND MOTIVES (1988).
253. DEBORAH CAMERON & ELIZABETH FRAZER, THE LUST To KILL at XV (1987).
254. For treatments of the debate, see DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING (1989);
ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
(1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Thought, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990). For an accessible discussion of how poststructuralist thought might influence
feminist jurisprudence, see Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist
Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987).
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preference, cultural identity, and the like.255  These post-
structuralists have as their goal the crafting of "a synthesis of class,
race and gender perspectives into a holistic and inclusive feminist
theory and practice."25 Their challenge goes to the heart of the
matter of gender. Thornhill, for one, demands that white feminists
re-edit their work in a way that the "experiences of Black
women ... are not 'merely tacked on as window dressing, dismissed
in parentheses, or hidden in footnotes."'2 7 Feminist theory often
begins by describing, defining, and exposing patriarchy. The word
is a wide conceptual umbrella that covers systems of male domi-
nance which oppress women through social, political, and economic
institutions.
In the criminal law area, feminists have attempted to demon-
strate that "what is perhaps the most paradigmatic expression of
patriarchical force - rape - is not, as the common mythology
insists, a crime of desire, passion, frustrated attraction, victim
provocation or uncontrollable biological urges."2 8
Less convincingly, feminists such as Susan Brownmiller assert
that sexual violence against women is culturally condoned and
widespread. Given the possibility of rape as well as its pervasive
actuality, Brownmiller described rape as "nothing more or less than
a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all
women in a state of fear." '259 She included all men because any man
could be a rapist, and even men who do not rape are the beneficia-
ries of the climate of coercion created by men who do. She defined
rape as an institution, because the weight of patriarchal culture
conspires with the rapist. She thus viewed rape as an insidious
form of social control, because rape is a constant reminder to all
women of their vulnerable condition. Andrea Dworkin argued that
255. See, e.g., Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in ALL THE WOMEN
ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE 13 (Gloria T. Hull et al.,
ed. 1982).
256. Maxine Baca Zinn et al., The Costs of Exclusionary Practices in Women's Studies, in
MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS: CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY
FEMINISTS OF COLOR 29, 35 (1990).
257. Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115,
117 (1989) (quoting Esmeralda Thornhill, Focus on Black Women, 1 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 153,
160 (1985)). For other critiques of white feminist theory and practice, see, e.g., COMMON
DIFFERENCES: CONFLICTS IN BLACK AND WHITE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Gloria Joseph & Jill
Lewis eds. 1981); HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed. 1983);
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1984); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST
THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984).
258. JANE CAPUTI, THE AGE OF THE SEX CRIME 3 (1987).
259. BROWNMILLER, supra note 233, at 15 (emphasis in original).
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the driving engine of male history is male violence.26 ° In Inter-
course,26' Dworkin also contended, unpersuasively, that pornogra-
phy underpins male supremacy.
Feminist theory is right to define rape not only as a violent act,
but also as a social institution which can have the effect of perpetu-
ating patriarchal domination. The perpetrators are thus not "an
aberrant fringe. Rather, rape is a social expression of sexual
politics, an institutionalized and ritual enactment of male domina-
tion, a form of terror which functions to maintain the status quo." '262
Brownmiller, Estrich, and others are also right that the law's
definitions and categories of rape are too narrow. Date rape is real
rape. Marital rape is real rape. Workplace rape is real rape. But
by arguing that all men are rapists, Brownmiller dilutes the idea of
rape. By obliterating real distinctions between rapists and non-
rapists, she minimizes the real harm caused by real rape. If all
men are rapists then none are.
One need not subscribe to Brownmiller's entire, facile
worldview - I prefer to be agnostic at the moment - to appreciate
her insight that rapists are not so different from the rest of us as we
might like to believe. As Greg Cook put it: "It's a penis thing. 263
As mentioned at the outset of this section, the transformation
of our intellectual and cultural understanding of rape had its gene-
sis in Brownmiller's 1975 book - only two years before Coker was
decided. Today, twenty years after Coker and twenty-two years
after Brownmiller's book, it could well be argued that Professor
Barrett is correct that the new capital rape statutes "would not be
vulnerable to the arguments (raised by Ms. Ginsburg [in her Coker
amicus]) that they are vestiges of viewing rape victims as male
property.
264
IV. RECONSTRUCTING COKER: THE RIGHT RESULT BUT FOR THE
WRONG REASONS, AND AN ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT THE
DEATH PENALTY FOR RAPE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: RACISM
The South before the war had mighty rigid codes: Slave owners,
feeling none too firm on the Ethics end, got mighty interested in
Manners.265
260. See ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY:
MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
261. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
262. CAPUTI, supra note 258, at 3.
263. Telephone conversation with the pacifist, Greg Cook (Aug. 27, 1994).
264. Barrett, supra note 7, at A21.
265. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1,'at 225.
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A. Rape, Race and Death
The second-saddest thing to fighting a war is remembering it
inch by inch decades later.266
The history of capital punishment for rape in America -
particularly in the American South - has been largely the history
of race;267 as has the history of constitutional challenges to the
legality of capital punishment in the American legal system.
The numbers are stark. In their "definitive" '268 study of the
racial dimensions of capital rape, Wolfgang and Riedel found that
of the 455 persons executed for rape between 1930 and 1972, 89.5%
were nonwhite.26 9 Wolfgang's and Riedel's "ambitious" study
sampled the case records of some three thousand convicted
rapists in eleven southern states (although the analysis has
thus far been limited to data from representative counties in six
of these states). The study found.., that other considerations
such as the degree of force used by the offender, the extent of
injury suffered by the victim, the fact of some other contempora-
neous felony, and the like, did not begin to account for the racial
differences in sentencing.7
Even Solicitor General Robert Bork, in his amicus brief in
Gregg v. Georgia, conceded the validity of the Wolfgang and Riedel
study.27'
In a national study of death row demographics at the time
Furman was decided in 1972, Marquart and Sorensen agreed, "Our
data reveal a clear pattern of discrimination that parallels the
findings of Wolfgang and Riedel. Of the eighty rapists on death row
266. Id. at 323.
267. On race and rape, see generally, JAMES MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND
THE NEEDLE 38-65 (1995); THORSTEN SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 13-40 (1980); William
B. Huie, The South Kills Another Negro, in THE DEATH PENALTY: A LITERACY AND
HISTORICAL APPROACH (E. McGehee & W. Hilderbrand eds., 1964); Rupert Koeninger,
Capital Punishment in Texas, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 132 (1969); Coramae Mann & Lance
Selva, The Sexualization of Racism, 3 W. J. BLACK STUD. 168 (1979); Donald H. Partington,
The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia, 22 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 43 (1965).
268. See James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-
Commuted Inmates, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 193, at 167.
269. See Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Racial Discrimination, Rape and The Death
Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 194 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1982).
270. BOWERS, supra note 193, at 70.
271. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 11-12, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976) (No. 74-6257).
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at the time of the Furman decision, all were incarcerated in
southern prison systems. 2, 7  Of these eighty, "sixty-eight (85%)
were non-white. The victims of these offenses were overwhelmingly
white. 273
And William Bowers' studies confirmed that actual executions
(as opposed to lynchings) for rape were "eight times as common
among blacks as among whites (17.9 as opposed to 2.2%, respec-
tively) who have been put to death under state authority. Indeed,
the absolute numbers reveal that the death penalty for rape has
been imposed overwhelmingly on blacks - 502 to 58 - by a nine-
,,274to-one ratio.
Given these numbers, it is perhaps unsurprising that when
civil rights organizations first began, in the early 1960s, to chal-
lenge the legality of capital punishment as an American legal
system, they focused on race and rape. In attacking capital
punishment as a fixture in American law since the creation of the
Republic, however, those civil rights lawyers had a substantial
burden of history to overcome.
1. The Old Days
The widow Mardsen's Lilac-Time Gala was a beloved tradition
hereabouts - but then too, so was slavery.275
The framers of the Constitution clearly contemplated the
validity of capital punishment; the Fifth Amendment spoke of
deprivations of "life or limb" by the federal courts without "due
process of law," a requirement extended to the state courts when
the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted during Reconstruction.
For the first century and a quarter of the nation, few seriously
questioned the constitutionality of capital punishment for rape or
murder.276 On August 27, 1927, however, Massachusetts executed
Nicola Sacco and Bartholomew Vanzetti, two Italian immigrants,
272. Marquart and Sorensen, supra note 268, at 168.
273. Id.
274. BOWERS, supra note 193, at 74 & tbl. 3-1.
275. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 231.
276. Florida's history of capital punishment is illustrative. In 1822, when Florida became
a territory, it became necessary to enact a criminal code. The First Legislative Council of
Florida, meeting in Pensacola, passed an act which provided for the first sanctioned death
penalty under Florida's territorial or state authority, and designated three offenses as
capital: murder, rape, and arson. See Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice:
Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 963-64 (1991).
Subsequent Florida legislative enactments retained capital punishment for rape. Id. at 964-
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who were also considered political radicals. Caught up in the
Palmer Raids and the first Red Scare following World War I, Sacco
and Vanzetti were likely innocent of the South Braintree robbery
and murder for which they were executed (another man had
confessed to the crimes).277 Sacco and Vanzetti lived on death row
for six years, while their claims of innocence and prejudice of the
trial judge worked their way through the courts. The final United
States Supreme Court opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, stated that in habeas corpus proceedings judicial prejudice
is not a specific violation of the Constitution, and that absent such
a constitutional violation the federal courts could not intervene into
a state criminal trial.
27 8
The Sacco and Vanzetti execution caused some thinking
Americans to wonder, not about the abstract wisdom of capital
punishment, but about the way in which the penalty was applied.
2 79
Capital punishment was becoming a civil rights issue. It is thus
perhaps understandable that the two preeminent national civil
rights organizations - the ACLU, founded in 1920, and the
NAACP, founded in 1939 - began taking a hard look at who was
being executed and under what circumstances.
Burton Wolfe, in his fascinating history Pileup on Death Row,
writes that the national protest demonstrations against the Sacco
and Vanzetti executions led the federal Department of Prisons, a
division of the Department of Justice, to begin keeping track of
executions in America for the first time." ° Americans received the
first realistic picture of death row demographics. During the first
six years of the record-keeping, 1930-1935, the record revealed that
the South executed four times as many people as any of the three
regions of the United States, and that it sentenced twice as many
blacks to death as whites.2 l
These government statistics provided quantitative and
disinterested support for facts that any Southerner worth his salt
knew all along. Capital punishment was a predominately Southern
phenomenon, disapportionately applied against black men,
especially black men accused of raping white women.
The demographics of executing rapists led the NAACP's Legal
Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), in 1950, to take on the
defense of black men accused of raping white women. Death was
277. See MICHAEL L. RADELET, ET AL, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992).
278. See ROBERTA STRAUSS FEURLIGHT, JUSTICE CRUCIFIED (1977).
279. See BURTON H. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH Row (1973).
280. See id. at 80.
281. See id.
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not the only issue on LDF's plate, of course. By the early 1950s,
LDF's legal challenges to the Plessey v. Ferguson282 "separate but
equal" doctrine and segregated public schools were chugging along
towards the landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion."83 Under the leadership of LDF's Thurgood Marshall, the
organization and its allies crafted a brilliant strategy of undermin-
ing Plessey before finishing it off.2" 4 Rather than waging a frontal
attack on Plessey's "separate" but "equal" doctrine, Thurgood
Marshall brought a series of cases28 to the Supreme Court arguing,
in various factual settings, that "separate" could never be "equal. 286
These early cases prepared the justices to overrule Plessey when the
frontal attack did arrive, in Brown v. Board. The cases prepared
the justices - psychologically and emotionally, as well as legally
and doctrinally - to accept Marshall's coup de grace to Plessey in
Brown. "Look," Marshall in effect said, "over the past few years we
have been proving, in case after case, that in a wide variety of
factual settings, 'separate' means 'unequal.' What we have been
proving is that 'separate but equal' is a doctrine that is not applied
fairly. It just does not work. The court should reject it."
This two-step litigation approach - undermining a noxious
precedent before asking for its outright rejection - is functionally
similar to the slow demise of the Betts v. Brady287 "special circum-
stances" rule for counsel, during the time between Betts v. Brady in
1942 and Gideon v. Wainwright88 in 1963.289 It also is similar to
LDF's challenges to capital punishment, which I will discuss now.
If Thurgood Marshall was the grand architect of Brown v.
Board of Education, Anthony Amsterdam was the architect of
Brown's capital punishment counterpart: the 1972 decision in
Furman v. Georgia290 outlawing capital punishment as then
administered in America and clearing every death row in every
state. As the pre-Brown cases set the stage for Plessey's eventual
overruling in Brown, so the pre-Furman cases set the stage for the
Furman court's rejection of capital punishment as then applied.
Sometimes individual justices of the Supreme Court send
signals to the legal world outside the Court - lawyers and lower
282. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
283. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
284. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
288. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
289. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1966).
290. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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court judges - indicating that, although a majority of the Court
was not quite ready to hear and decide particular constitutional
questions, the justices were interested in those issues and the
attorneys should persevere and keep on asking the Court to decide
those constitutional questions. One such method of telegraphing
this message is dissenting from the denial of petition for writ of
certiorari (plenary review). In 1963 such a dissent galvanized the
nascent legal campaign to outlaw capital punishment.291
In an Alabama rape case, Justice Arthur Goldberg, along with
Justices William 0. Douglas and William Brennan, signaled that
the Court might be receptive to constitutional challenges to capital
punishment for rape.292 Six justices voted against hearing the
Alabama rape case, but Goldberg's dissent suggested that in the
future the Court might be receptive to considering whether, in light
of the worldwide trend against the death penalty for rape, executing
rapists violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."2 93 Also, the three dissenters wrote
that the questions of disproportionality and "unnecessary cruelty"
of death for rapists deserved the Court's full consideration.9 4
Herbert Haines, in his indispensable book Against Capital
Punishment,295 writes that the Goldberg dissent was an intentional
signal to the lawyers who were considering the use of the courts to
abolish capital punishment for rape. 96 That signal was received
"loud and clear" at LDF and ACLU. Borrowing a page from
Thurgood's playbook in Brown v. Board of Education, LDF capital
litigators, now led by Jack Greenberg, reasoned that the Court was
not likely to strike down capital punishment on constitutional
grounds "in one judicial stroke." '297 Thus, LDF
chose to attack the death penalty indirectly. They began
working on a strategy that would attack the process by which
convicted criminals were sentenced to die. There were two
parts to this strategy. One involved a concerted assault on
racial discrimination in death sentencing and the other per-
tained to selected trial procedures in capital cases.2 98
291. See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1996); WOLFE, supra note
279, MELTSNER, supra note 78.
292. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) cert. denied.
293. Trop v. Dullus, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
294. 375 U.S. at 891.
295. See HAINES, supra note 291.
296. See id.
297. Id. at 27.
298. Id.
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The latter attack focused on three common features of capital trials
at the time. First, the exclusion of "death scrupled"299 jurors from
sitting on capital juries, thus depriving capital defendants of the
right to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community. 00
Second, the simultaneous determination by the jury of guilt and
sentence in a single, unified trial. Third, the absence of clear and
objective standards to guide the jury's process of deciding who
dies.3"1
2. Pileup on Death Row
During war nothing comes at you on the level. 2
These challenges, and the appeals they generated, proved to be a
successful strategy for convincing courts to put executions on hold
until the lower courts, and eventually the United States Supreme
Court, had a chance to consider and decide the various constitu-
tional issues LDF was asserting in individual capital cases all
across the country. By the mid-1960s, Amsterdam and LDF had
won a virtual moratorium on executions in the United States. If a
death row prisoner had a lawyer to file the legal papers mass-
produced by LDF - called "Last Aid Kits" - the condemned
prisoner was entitled to a stay of execution. Amsterdam explained
the strategy to Burton:
As papers came across my desk, I kept seeing cases of
blacks sentenced to death in the South. I was constantly
confronted with the fact that in dealing with the death penalty,
we were not merely dealing with a barbaric relic of civilization
in its most savage days, but also with discrimination against
blacks, the poor, the pariahs and outcasts of society. At the
same time, as I looked at all the violence going on in our society,
the death penalty came to symbolize to me the tendency to
resort to violence instead of reason in seeking the solution to
problems. This insight came to me while I was handling
attacks on the death penalty on a case by case basis, on specific
issues such as exclusion of black people and poor people from
juries, loss of rights to counsel, and so on. This larger insight
came together with a case by case study of discrimination
against blacks in the South, often involving the death sentence.
299. Id. at 28.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 62.
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When I pulled all of that together, I knew that abolishing the
death penalty altogether was the major job to be done." 3
But what if the death row prisoner did not have a lawyer? LDF
might be able to find him one. But what if LDF did not even know
of that prisoner's existence? What if LDF did not know a person
with a pending execution date even needed a lawyer?
Such was the situation in Florida in 1966: the second largest
death row population in the nation (fifty-two condemned men) and
not enough lawyers to file LDF's form papers to stay the
execution. °4 Until 1966, Florida's death row population was not at
risk of imminent executions. The state had been governed, in
succession, by three adversaries of capital punishment: Leroy
Collins, Faris Bryant, and Haydon Burns. But in 1966, Claude
Kirk was elected governor. Governor Kirk was elected following
campaign promises to enforce the death penalty. Kirk was
determined to keep his promise.3 °5
Thus, Florida became one of the principal crises states for
Amsterdam and LDF. If Florida began executing people, the entire
shaky national moratorium on execution was in jeopardy of coming
apart. Much of the moratorium's power was grounded in percep-
tion. Amsterdam and LDF had persuaded various judges and
governors in the capital punishment states that the United States
Supreme Court would countenance no executions until the Supreme
Court had sorted out the challenges to the legality of capital
punishment as a legal system. The moratorium was thus in part a
self-fulfilling prophecy. If Florida broke ranks, then other states
might as well.
The Florida Supreme Court would let those executions proceed,
even though those people electrocuted by "Old Sparky" lacked
lawyers to raise the very constitutional claims that were causing
stays in many other states. This was, after all, the same Florida
Supreme Court that had refused to give Clarence Earl Gideon a
lawyer in his felony robbery trial.3" 6 It was not until the United
States Supreme Court reversed in Gideon v. Wainwright °7 that the
Florida Supreme Court joined the rest of the nation in providing
court-appointed lawyers to citizens on trial for non-capital felonies.
Since the Florida Supreme Court did not think lawyers were a
303. WOLFE, supra note 279, at 232-33.
304. See id. at 229.
305. See id. at 230.
306. See LEWIS, supra note 289.
307. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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fundamental right at felony trials, the justices could hardly be
expected to extend Gideon to require counsel for habeas corpus
proceedings in federal court.
Thus, the capital counsel problem in Florida was as follows: a
large (and undefined) death row population; no lawyers for each
individual prisoner; a governor intent on signing death warrants on
an unknown quantity of those prisoners; and a state supreme court
willing to allow unrepresented people be executed. That was the
problem.
The solution was crafted by Toby Simon, president of the
Florida ACLU. Simon's strategy - called "Simon's Frolic" by some
LDF lawyers0 8 - was to file a class action on behalf of all Florida
death row prisoners. Up until then, challenges to capital punish-
ment had been raised in individual cases. A class action permits a
group of similarly situated people (such as a state's death row
population) to establish the rights of the entire class, and to do it in
a single court case. As Amsterdam explained:
Until Kirk became governor in Florida, this was still on a
piecemeal basis. But the way he was talking, it looked as
though there was going to be a bloodbath. So, there was no
time for a case by case procedure any longer. Realizing this led
Toby Simon [Tobias Simon, Miami attorney who spent many
years fighting against capital punishment on his own and for
the ACLU] to suggest filing a class action. The legal team we
put together adopted this idea and used it to argue on the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself instead of just the
measures that were being used to inflict it: measures such as
all-white juries. °9
Toby Simon's class action strategy worked. The class action
lawsuit was filed in April 1967 in federal district court in Jackson-
ville, Florida. On April 13, 1967, federal district judge William
McCrae, Jr. issued a temporary stay of all Florida executions pend-
ing further proceedings. The moratorium would hold in Florida.
But not elsewhere, at least not yet. The day after McCrae
issued his Florida stay, Aaron Mitchell was executed by lethal gas
in California. On June 2, 1967, Jose Monge was hanged in
Colorado. Monge would be the last execution for ten years in
America, however, until Gary Gilmore volunteered for death by
Utah firing squad in 1977.
308. See, MELTSNER, supra note 78, at 130.
309. WOLFE, supra note 279, at 233.
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Anthony Amsterdam, the moratorium's master planner,
described to Wolfe how the executions of Mitchell and Monge made
LDF lawyers feel:
It was very upsetting. We were so busy with the [Florida] class
action that we had no idea any execution had been scheduled
elsewhere. Right after that we got calls from people in Califor-
nia who said: "Hey, look what's going on out here. It's the same
thing as in Florida. We've got a new governor [Reagan] who
favors capital punishment and doesn't even attend clemency
hearings. We need help to stop a bloodbath here, too." So, we
flew to California and filed our class action there as well ....
In the fall of 1967 we decided to go public rather than
continue working on our own in seclusion," Tony Amsterdam
recalled three years later, his agony over the deaths of Mitchell
and Monge still unabated. 'The first reason was that we'd
proved we had the methods and the power to stop executions,
but new execution dates were being set too fast for us to get
prepared for them. The Mitchell case really focused our
thinking on this because it caught us completely unprepared
and we had to watch him die without being able to do anything
about it. Drawings of the gas-chamber scene appeared in the
newspapers and on television; it was like we were observing it,
and we were horrified. This gave us an imperative, a moral
duty, to see to it that it never happened again.
The second reason for going public was that we felt if we
could produce a public network that would stop executions for
a while, then when we got up to the state or federal supreme
court it would be harder for justices to turn down our appeals
based on the Constitution and start the executions up again.
Once we stopped the executions, the courts would then have to
face the awful reality that a decision in favor of capital punish-
ment would start the bloodbath again.
Let me explain it this way: the main difficulty we have
been faced with is this argument that capital punishment is
still needed in our society as retribution against the worst
offenders, as a preventive of crime, as a way of bringing about
greater morality. It's a ridiculous argument with absolutely
nothing to back it up, but it's so emotional and so deeply
ingrained in our society that it's hard to get rid of it. But if we
could actually stop the executions, establish this condition that
so many people are afraid of, and then show that the country
was not falling apart because of it, then we could stop the
judges from thinking along the lines of this emotional argu-
ment.
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So, that's why we set up a public network - to stop the
executions and set the groundwork for our effort to get rid of the
death penalty on constitutional grounds in the court. Stopping
executions, all executions, became our business."31
LDF's strategy led to the 1967-77 moratorium on executions in
America while the courts sorted through the legal challenges to
capital punishment. Also, on the road to the 1971 and 1972 cases
in which the Supreme Court squarely addressed, for the first time,
the legality of capital punishment itself, the Court revolutionized
the death-deciding process in state capital trials. In 1968 the Court
struck down the "Lindbergh Law" which made defendants subject
to capital punishment only if they exercised their right to jury trial.
Also in 1968, the Court, in the Witherspoon case, sharply limited
the states' ability to exclude from capital cases potential jurors with
moral doubts about the death penalty."
These cases were stage-setters to the Supreme Court's
confrontation with the legality of capital punishment itself. Two
false starts, Boykin312 in 1969 and Maxwell 313 in 1970, provided the
justices with opportunities to address the larger issue of capital
punishment's constitutionality, but in both cases the Court ducked,
deciding both cases on narrower, case-specific procedural grounds.
The Supreme Court, however, finally decided the big issues. It was
the culmination of Amsterdam's and LDF's constitutional attack on
capital punishment, and it seemed that they had lost.
In 1970, the Court granted certiorari review in McGautha v.
California."4 Amsterdam and LDF raised the full range of their
procedural challenges to capital punishment, arguing that the
unitary trail and the absence of sentencing standards offended the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due process of law."3"' The
Supreme Court issued its decision in McGautha in 1971. Amster-
dam and LDF had lost by a vote of six to three.
3. Constitutional Earthquake
War ended and stillness suddenly got scarier than noise. 16
310. Id. at 234, 244-45.
311. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
312. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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314. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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316. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 170.
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The moratorium on executions appeared to be over. Now that
the Court had spoken, LDF prepared for a "bloodbath." In mid-May
an emergency conference was held at Columbia Law School. Haines
writes that, "the central conclusion" to be drawn from McGautha
and its companion cases, Amsterdam told the conferees, was that
"the Supreme Court could not be expected to take any favorable
action on the death penalty anytime soon."31
LDF still had its Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual
punishment" angle to present to the Supreme Court; it would be a
relatively simple matter for LDF to repackage its "due process"
challenges as Eighth Amendment challenges. If, however, the
procedural challenges had a chance of persuading the Court to
outlaw capital punishment itself, "due process of law" seemed to
provide the justices with the best constitutional hook. LDF,
however, had lost the due process claim in McGautha.
Less than two months after McGautha was decided, however,
the Court agreed to hear four cases to decide the Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to capital punishment as a legal system. Two cases
involved murder and two involved rape. This package of four cases
became known as Furman v. Georgia.318
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Furman and its
three companion cases on January 17, 1972. Amsterdam argued
Furman brilliantly. Still, there was little reason for optimism.
LDF's best arguments had been shot down in McGautha. Two new
Nixon appointments to the Court did not help LDF's odds.
Then lightning struck. On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Furman. Amsterdam and LDF had won,
five votes to four. The very procedural challenges to capital
punishment that the Court had rejected one year earlier, in
McGautha in 1971, had carried the day in Furman in 1972. The
legal system of capital punishment, as it then existed, was history.
Every capital statute was invalidated. Every death sentence of
every person on death row was to be reduced to life imprisonment.
In a stroke more than six hundred condemned people were no
longer subject to execution.
Haines writes that the news of Furman struck LDF's New York
headquarters 'like an earthquake .... That evening, while a rock
band called The Eighth Amendment' played in the library of their
headquarters on Columbus Circle, [LDF] staffers celebrated into
317. HAINES, supra note 291, at 36.
318. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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the wee hours."3 19 Michael Meltsner describes the scene as the
news of Furman first came in:
within minutes the story began to appear on every major wire
service ticker. Calls jammed the [LDF] switchboard. Lawyers
and secretaries produced transistor radios. General disbelief.
Numbness. Tears in people's eyes. Slowly smiles replaced
gaping jaws; laughter and embraces filled the halls. 'This place
looks like we just landed a man on the moon," [staffer Douglas]
Lyons shouted into a phone. s2 °
4. Aftershocks
It's tough, being a good housekeeper for pretty much total
chaos.32 '
June 29, 1972, is a singular date in the history of American
jurisprudence. Although Furman marked the end of one era of
capital punishment and of the courts, it also marked the beginning
of a new and, in many respects, more complicated era. Furman did
not outlaw capital punishment per se; only two justices, Thurgood
Marshall and William Brennan, would have gone that far. The
three other justices in the five to four Furman majority only voted
to eliminate the capital punishment legal system as it was then
applied. Thus, seven justices - the three other than Brennan and
Marshall in the Furman majority, plus the four dissenters, seemed
to leave open the possibility that states could retool and restore
capital punishment as a legal system, and that such new statutes
would pass constitutional muster. In fact, the primary procedural
defects in the death penalty statues struck down in Furman
appeared easy to correct. Replace the unitary trial with a bifur-
cated trial, at which guilt and sentence would be tried and decided
in two separate proceedings. Also, provide the sentencing jury with
standards (statutorily-listed aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, for example) to guide its consideration of whether the
particular defendant has lost his moral entitlement to live, and
deserves to die for his crimes.
Thus, Furman shifted the battleground from the courts to the
state legislatures. State legislatures were left with the task of
crafting and enacting revised capital statutes responsive to the
319. HAINES, supra note 291, at 38.
320. MELTSNER, supra note 78, at 290.
321. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 21.
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commands of the Furman decision. The problem was that there
was no single "opinion" of the five justices in the Furman majority.
Each of the five wrote separate opinions, and no justice in the
majority joined the opinion of any other justice in the majority. The
four dissenters also wrote their own opinions. In all, Furman
produced nine complicated opinions by all nine justices - the
longest series of opinions in a single case in the history of the
United States Supreme Court.
Despite the confusion generated by Furman's fractured Court,
state legislatures set about drafting and enacting revised death
penalty statutes. Florida led the way, enacting its new statute in
December 1972.322 Other states quickly followed suit. Over the
next few years, thirty-five states would enact revised death penalty
statutes.3 23  In 1976 the Supreme Court upheld the abstract
constitutionality of the new statutes in Florida, Georgia, and
Texas.
324
America had seen no executions since 1967, and the courts
grappled with the constitutional dimensions of capital punishment.
The moratorium on executions lasted ten years and it ended with
Gary Gilmore. Gilmore had murdered a gas station attendant and
a motel clerk and was sentenced to death. Gilmore wanted to die,
and decided to abandon all possible legal challenges to his death
sentence.325
A few months after Gilmore's statute-assisted suicide, the
Supreme Court decided Coker v. Georgia.326 In the lead brief for
Anthony Coker, LDF attorney David Kendall and his colleagues
argued the racist history of capital punishment for rape. Yet not a
single justice addressed the race issue in an opinion in Coker. Why
not? I have always wondered.
I do not know, but I can speculate. I have long thought that the
court ignored the racial dimensions of capital punishment for rape
because they were looking ahead to constitutional challenges to
capital punishment for murder. If the social studies on rape and
race had constitutional significance, then later studies demonstrat-
ing a connection between race and capital punishment for murder
would also rise to constitutional magnitude. In other words, basing
Coker on Wolfgang's study would expose the murder statutes, that
the court had just upheld the year before, to attack based on future
322. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141 (West 1972).
323. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
324. See id.
325. See MAILER, supra note 2.
326. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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social science studies. If capital punishment as applied to rape was
unconstitutionally racist, then capital punishment as applied to
murder might be unconstitutionally racist as well.
Perhaps the justices in Coker intuited that social science would
be able to document racism in capital punishment for murder - as
Wolfgang and others had documented racism in capital punishment
for rape. If so, the justices were right. David Baldus directed the
study, which reached the Supreme Court in the case of Warren
McCleskey. The court decided McCleskey v. Kemp 327 in 1987, ten
years after it had decided Coker v. Georgia.
B. McCleskey: The Study
It's our duty, imagining each other.325
Numerous statistical studies of the post-Furman administra-
tion of capital punishment for murder have found that the death
penalty is rarely imposed when the victim's race is black, regardless
of the race of the defendant. These patterns have been documented
by David Baldus, William Bowers, Glenn Pierce, Samuel Gross and
other scholars. 329 Baldus and his colleagues, however, conducted
327. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
328. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 266.
329. See generally DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990)
[hereinafter BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE]; SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Raymond Paternoster
& Ann-Marie Kazyaka, Racial Considerations in Capital Punishment: The Failure of
Evenhanded Justice, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Kenneth C. Haas & James A.
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the most comprehensive study ever of capital sentencing patterns.
The study examined the state of Georgia. This study became the
basis of the now definitive Supreme Court decision addressing the
constitutional consequences of racial disparities in capital sentenc-
ing.
The legal conversation about racism in the capital punishment
system has occurred principally in constitutional terms. The
Supreme Court ended this conversation at the federal constitutional
level in 1987 when, in McCleskey v. Kemp,33 the Court held that a
constitutional challenge to such racism must show intentional
discrimination without the benefit of presumptions of the type that
are used in other areas of discrimination law, such as employment
or jury selection. The Court also held the statistical study at issue
in that case - the Baldus study of Georgia's capital punishment
system, a state-of-the-art study costing $500,000 and rightly called
"the Cadillac of race studies" - insufficient to require a finding of
discriminatory intent under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
David Baldus and his colleagues presented two sets of data.
The first set was taken from the Procedural Reform Study (PRS),
which began prior to 1980. The second and major set of data was
the Charging and Sentencing Study (CSS)."'
The study was designed to compare pre- and post-Furman
sentencing of those convicted of murder in Georgia.332 Its purpose
was to evaluate the effectiveness of Furman-mandated statutory
reform in reducing arbitrariness and discrimination.333 It focused
Texas 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 132 (1969); Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial
Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty, 18 L. & Soc'Y REV. 437 (1984); Raymond
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(1983); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimination in Assessments of the Death Penalty:
The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279 (1987); Marvin Wolfgang, Race, Judicial
Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 119 (1973).
330. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Warren McCleskey was executed on September 25, 1991. See
Peter Appelbome, Georgia Inmate is Executed After "Chaotic" Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1991, at A18.
331. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 329, at 310-14 (discussing the background
of the hearing in McCleskey and the study results offered). See GROSS & MAURO, supra note
329, at 153 n.20 (noting that, contrary to the slights the Baldus study received in the courts,
the study has garnered high praise from social science professionals). A member of the
National Academy of Sciences panel which reviews criminal sentencing research called the
CSS "far and away the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing." McCleskey v.
Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). It received the Kalven award for excellence in empirical research of the law, given by
the Law and Society Association.
332. BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 329, at 42.
333. See id.
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on the two steps following conviction: the prosecutor's decision to
seek the death penalty, and the jury's decision following the penalty
trial.334
The PRS findings presented in federal court were of two types.
First, there were a series of multiple regression analyses which
adjusted variously for between five and 150 nonracial aggravating
and nonaggravating factors.335 This analysis showed disparities
among defendants convicted at trial of between eight and nine
percentage points at a significance level "at or beyond" .05, based on
the race of their victims. Generally there are two levels of statisti-
cal significance which are deemed to validate the strength of the
independent variable(s). The first level is .05 (p<.05). This means
that the probability is less than one in twenty that the contributing
factor could occur by chance. As the probability value decreases the
degree of significance increases. 316 In other words, if someone threw
a coin toss twenty times and nineteen of the throws came up heads,
there is a less than five percent probability that this outcome
occurred because of chance. If someone threw a coin toss one
hundred times and the coin came up heads ninety-nine times, then
it can be said that there is a less than one percent probability that
this outcome occurred because of chance. In this latter case the
statistical level of significance is known as .01 (p<.01). The smaller
the p-value, the less likely the probability that a given event
occurred by chance. In either case the individual tossing the coin
would have to look for other factors (independent variables) to
account for the outcome, for example, faulty coin, fixed toss, etc.
While acceptance of the statistically significant standards of .05 and
.01 are widely recognized as being arbitrary, they have long been
widely accepted by statisticians and the courts.
There are several basic areas of concern about the validity of
regression analysis. One is whether or not the model which is used
is complete: have all relevant variables been included? Another is
the issue of the fit of the data to the assumptions about the data:
does the cumulative data in fact support the assumption? Third is
the question of sampling error: was the sample size large enough;
did it truly reflect the population; and were there any unexplained
effects from the particular sample? The most important of these
issues is that of "goodness of fit." If the fit is good then the
estimates or predictions of the data should agree with the observ-
334. See id.
335. See id. at 312.
336. See id.
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able data. The statistical model should be able to explain what has
actually occurred; in other words, if there is "goodness of fit" then
the independent variables which were tested should provide an
answer to why the dependent variable occurred in the first place,
and these results should be observable. There is, however, a point
of diminishing return. Providing too many variables makes the
procedure too specific to the sample size at hand, thus making
claims of generalizability more difficult and less valid. The goal is
not to answer questions related to a particular model, but to provide
a basis for predicting similar situations in the future.3  This
analysis showed disparities among defendants convicted at trial of
between eight and nine percentage points, at a significance level "at
or beyond" .05, based on the race of their victims.3"' The second
study consisted of small-scale logistic-regression analyses control-
ling for five to ten legitimate background factors such as prior
record or number of victims.339 These findings yielded odds
multipliers34 ° of 2.8 and 3.0, at the .01 significance level, for those
who were convicted of murdering whites.341
The CSS reported on death-sentencing rates among defendants
convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter in Georgia from
1973 through 1979, from the point of indictment through the
penalty trial jury decision."' The range of the CSS, then, was wider
than the PRS.343 The CSS data was taken from the Georgia Board
of Pardons and Paroles.344
During the period of 1973 through 1979 there were 2,484
defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter or murder, 1,066
of whom formed the "stratified random sample" used in the CSS
study.3 4' The overall death sentencing rate for the entire 2,484
cases was five percent, or 128 defendants.346 Unadjusted figures in
the Baldus study showed that the death penalty rate for white-
victim cases was 108 out of 981, while that for black-victim cases
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 312-13.
340. "[O]dds multiplier'... indicates the degree to which the average defendant's odds of
receiving a death sentence are enhanced by having a white rather than a black victim after
controlling statistically for all of the other independent variables in the analyses." Id. at 383-
84.
341. See id. at 312, 354, & 354 tbl. 4.
342. See id. at 45, 313.
343. See id. at 45.
344. See id. at 46.
345. See id. at 45 & 67 n.10.
346. See id. at 314.
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was twenty out of 1,503.14' Thus, white-victim defendants were
sentenced to death at a rate 8.3 times higher than black-victim
defendants.
3 41
What Baldus calls the "centerpiece" of the evidence presented
in McCleskey was a logistic-regression analysis utilizing thirty-nine
conceptually and statistically important variables, which produced
an odds multiplier of 4.3 for those convicted of killing whites,
significant at the .005 level.349 This "core model" of thirty-nine
variables included those that "appeared to exercise the greatest
influence in determining which defendants indicted for murder
would actually receive a death sentence."35 In addition to the "core
model," the CSS also included supplemental linear and logistic
multiple-regression analyses which controlled for varying numbers
of background factors.351 A 230-variable model yielded a race-of-
victim partial coefficient of .06, significant at the .01 level.352
Warren McCleskey's own case fell in a "mid-range" aggravation
level.353 At this level, the race-of-victim effects were more pro-
nounced than in cases with low aggravation or extremely high
aggravation.35 4 Whereas there were six to seven percentage point
disparities estimated for all 2,484 cases,35 the mid-range cases'
estimated disparities ranged from eleven to twenty-nine percentage
points, with the "best estimate" being seventeen percentage points,
at the ninety-five percent confidence level.356 Thus, in cases with
aggravation levels similar to McCleskey's, defendants in white-
victim murders were sentenced to death at a rate between .34 and
.43, while defendants with black victims were sentenced to death at
347. See id. at 315 tbl. 50.
348. See id.
349. See id. at 316. For an explanation of the odds multiplier, see id. at 383-84. Baldus
notes that this 4.3 odds multiplier "is virtually identical to the race-of-victim disparity
estimated for the Procedural Reform Study in a comparable analysis of defendants found
guilty of murder at trial." Id. at 316.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 317 tbl. 51.
352. See id. This .06 figure was misunderstood by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit when it considered the Baldus study in McCleskey v. Kemp. A
coefficient such as .06 indicates a percentage point disparity. Baldus uses the following
example. If the base rate for death sentences among a group of black-victim cases is 10%,
then the .06 coefficient attached to this 10% rate will yield a comparable rate for white-victim
cases of 16% (.06 x 100% = 6%; 10% + 6% = 16%). This is an increase of 60% (16% is 60%
greater than 10%). Thus, the "bottom line" in this example is not 6% but 60%.
353. See id. at 320-21 & 321 fig. 32.
354. See id.
355. This is the .06 coefficient.
356. BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 329, at 320-21.
EXECUTING RAPISTS
rates between .14 and .23.31' Furthermore, within the 472 most
aggravated cases, which accounted for ninety percent of the death
sentences, there was a mid-range of cases showing disparities by
race-of-victim of twenty to thirty percentage points.35
The CSS study included analysis of race-of-victim effects in the
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty following a murder
conviction in Georgia. 59 Here, the odds multiplier of 3.1 was black-
victim cases, significant at the .01 level.3' Race-of-victim effects at
the jury penalty trial phase, however, were "weak . . . [and] not
statistically significant. ' 36 1 At the pre-trial phase, race-of-victim
effects showed up in the prosecutors' decisions to permit voluntary
manslaughter pleas after murder indictments: black-victim cases
were "far more likely" to result in the manslaughter pleas.362
Baldus concluded that "the race-of-victim effects in death sentenc-
ing observed among defendants indicted for murder were attribut-
able principally to prosecutorial decisions made both before and
after trial. 363
Baldus concluded that his study demonstrated disparities
sufficiently stark to create an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion, as that concept has come to be understood in the Supreme
Court's constitutional cases defining discrimination in jury selection
and employment discrimination. As such, the study established a
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. As the following section explains, the Supreme
Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment claim on the ground that
intentional discrimination in McCleskey's own case had not been
established. The Court rejected the Eighth Amendment claim on
the ground that the risk of discrimination in McCleskey's case was
not sufficiently great to constitute a violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Samuel Gross put these figures in perspective:
Coronary heart disease, it is well known, is associated with
cigarette smoking. But what is the magnitude of the effect?
One of the pioneering studies in the field, by Hammond and
357. See id. at 321.
358. See id. at 321-22 & 322 tbl. 53.
359. See id. at 326 & 327 tbl. 56.
360. See id. at 327.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 328.
363. Id.
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Horn,864 studied 187,783 men between the ages of fifty and
sixty-nine over a forty-four month period. Deaths from coronary
artery disease during the study period were fairly rare - a total
of 5297 or 2.8% of the sample - but cigarette smokers came in
far more than their share: controlling for age, smokers were 1.7
times more likely to die of coronary artery disease than non-
smokers. 65 Expressing this effect as an odds ratio hardly
changes its magnitude at all.' This is not an isolated example.
Another well-known study, by Joseph T. Doyle and colleagues,
reports that the smokers it followed faced two times the risk of
death from coronary heart disease as the nonsmokers, 67 and
many other medical studies reach the same conclusion: smoking
cigarettes increases the risk of death from heart disease greatly,
but by a considerably smaller amount than the race-of-victim
effect [of the Baldus study] ......
C. McCleskey: The Man
The Civil War and the First World One, those were the last
wars where the general of one side kept his opposite's general's
portrait in his tent.... When your enemy - like ours nowadays
- ceases having a nose, two eyes, one mouth, then you've got
troubles. You're up against a dervish and a ghost, an evil
empire. Me, in my time, us in our time - we were lucky, we
knew the shoe size of the opposition.369
Warren McCleskey, an African-American, was charged with
killing a white police officer during the course of an armed robbery.
He was convicted and condemned in Georgia. McCleskey claimed
first in state court and then in federal district court that Georgia's
capital statute allows race factors to affect the administration of
capital sentencing. As proof, he offered the results of the statistical
study performed by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues, the
most sophisticated study of sentencing patterns ever undertaken.
364. Samuel Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275, 1307 (1985) (citing
Hammond & Horn, Smoking and Death Rates - Report on Forty-Four Months of Follow-up
of 187,783 Men, 166 J.A.M.A. 1294 (1958)).
365. Id. (citing Hammond & Horn, Smoking and Death Rates - Report on Forty-Four
Months of Follow-up of 187,783 Men, 166 J.A.M.A. 1294, 1295 tbl. 1 (1958)).
366. When, as here, P (probability) is small, then (1-P) is very close in value to 1 and the
odds ratio - P/(1/P) - becomes very close in value to P.
367. Id. (citing Doyle et al., The Relationship of Cigarette Smoking to Coronary Heart
Disease, 190 J.A.M.A. 866, 889 tbl. 3 (1964)).
368. Id. at 1308.
369. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 121, 122-23.
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The district court rejected McCleskey's claim, holding that the
Baldus study was statistically flawed and would not support
McCleskey's constitutional challenges to the statute. 37 0 The court
held that McCleskey had failed to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.
3 71
The Eleventh Circuit, taking the case en banc in the first
instance, affirmed. The court purported to presume the study
acceptable.3 72 It was, however, unwilling to accept the principal
inference that it established proof of a case of class-wide race-of-
victim discrimination.3 73 The majority opinion held that the same
standards of proof govern racial discrimination challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 374 Intentional discrimination must be shown under
either constitutional provision. The majority opinion recognized
that "[d]ue process and cruel and unusual punishment cases do not
usually focus on the intent of the government actor,' 3 7' but the court
ultimately held that when the content of the claim is racial
discrimination in sentencing decisions "intent and motive are a
natural component of the proof .... ,,37' To prevail under either
constitutional theory, a prisoner must offer proof of a "disparate
impact [that] is so great that it compels a conclusion that the
system is unprincipled, irrational, arbitrary and capricious such
that purposeful discrimination... can be presumed to permeate the
system.,377
Applying this analytical framework to the Baldus study, the
majority opinion reaffirmed the court's previous holdings that
statistical evidence of racial discrimination "may be so strong that
the results permit no other inference .... ,,37' No evidentiary
hearing, however, would be required on statistical studies of capital
sentencing discrimination - regardless of their quality - unless
they "reflect a disparity so great as to inevitably lead to a conclusion
that the disparity results from intent or motivation." 7' The court
370. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379-80 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
371. See id. at 379.
372. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 881, 886-87 (11th Cir. 1985).
373. See id.
374. See id. at 891-92.
375. Id. at 892.
376. 753 F.2d at 892.
377. Id.
378. Id. (quoting Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 840, 859 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 882 (1982)).
379. Id. at 894.
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reasoned that "it is a legal question as to how much [racial]
disparity is required before a federal court will accept it as evidence
of the constitutional flaws in the system. '8 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed by a razor-
thin vote of five to four.38 ' The justices considered McCleskey's
certiorari petition for one year before deciding to grant it. This was
an early signal that "the case was uncommonly troublesome. 35 2
This early warning sign was later confirmed by the Court's decision:
"It is clear from the majority and dissenting opinions that this was
a difficult and divisive case; it is also clear that the Court's
judgment marked the end of an era in the constitutional regulation
of the death penalty in the United States. 383 The majority did not
deny the racism demonstrated by the Baldus study, and purported
to presume the study valid. The Court abdicated its power to do
anything about the disparities disclosed by the study. The opinion
stands as a declaration of impotence.
Former Justice Lewis Powell cast the decisive fifth vote to
constitute a majority of the Court and wrote the Court's opinion.
This courtly Virginian's record on matters of race, as chair of the
Richmond school board during the crucial period from 1952 to 1961,
was mixed even according to his admirers.38 4 Powell's opinion
380. Id. at 893.
381. See 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
382. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 329, at 159.
383. Id.
384. Professor (now federal judge) J. Harvie Wilkinson, a former clerk for Justice Powell
and admirer of the Justice, provided a balanced view of Powell's tenure on the Richmond,
Virginia school board:
As chairman of the Richmond school board from 1952 to 1961, Powell
wrestled with the agonies of transition Brown had brought to the South. At the
Senate hearings on his confirmation, two quite opposite views emerged on his
tenure. The first was that of a man "in a position of complex responsibility
during some very turbulent and confused times" whose "primary concern was
to keep the schools of Virginia open and to preserve the public education system
for all pupils." Possibly 'Mr. Powell's outstanding contribution to Virginia,"
noted the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, "was his leadership in the quiet sabotage by
a business-industrial-professional group of Senator Byrd's Massive Resistance."
In later articles Powell blamed much of the lawlessness of the 1960's on
southern defiance of the Brown decision. He was not unsympathetic to the
Negro's plight: "It is true," he noted in 1966, "that the Negro has had, until
recent years, little reason to respect the law. The entire legal process, from the
police and sheriff to the citizens who serve on juries, has too often applied a
double standard of justice. Even some of the courts at lower levels have failed
to administer equal justice .... There were also the discriminatory state and
local laws, the denial of voting rights, and the absence of economic and
educational opportunity for the Negro. Finally, there was the small and
depraved minority which resorted to physical violence and intimidation. These
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assumed the factual validity of the Baldus study (i.e., that the study
proved what it said it proved), and concluded as a matter of federal
constitutional law, that the touchstone of McCleskey's constitu-
tional claims must be intentional discrimination against him
personally, and that the proof cannot rely on the presumptions
applied when similar statistically based claims are offered to
establish class-wide discrimination in employment or in jury
selection cases.3" 5 Assuming as valid the Baldus data that death
sentences are four times more likely when the victim is white, the
majority reasoned that discrepancies were inevitable.3 8 "Because
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process," the Court
"would demand exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that
the discretion has been abused."38 7 Without additional proof of
individual discrimination, statistical studies were insufficient.8
Powell noted that statistical disparities ordinarily must be
"stark" before gaining acceptance as the sole proof of discriminatory
conditions, which have sullied our proud boast of equal justice under law, set
the stage for the civil rights movement."
By most measures of opinion in the aftermath of Brown, Powell was very
much a moderate. That meant he was also a gradualist, a symbol to Negroes
of the frustrating pace of progress in the South. By 1961, when Powell left the
school board, only 37 Richmond Negroes out of more than 23,000 had enrolled
in white schools. Shortly afterward, the Fourth Circuit found in Richmond a
system of dual attendance zones and feeder schools designed to keep racial
integration to a minimum. "Notwithstanding the fact that the [state] Pupil
Placement Board assigns pupils to the various Richmond schools without
recommendation of the local officials," observed the Fourth Circuit, "we do not
believe that the City School Board can disavow all responsibility for the
maintenance of the discriminatory system which has apparently undergone no
basic change since its adoption." Simply because Powell "had sense enough to
recognize the futility of the massive resistance program and to go for a more
sophisticated scheme of evading the Brown decision
[should] not affect your decision," argued the prominent Richmond black
attorney Henry Marsh to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 'The Constitution
outlaws the ingenious as well as the obvious scheme, and the fact that Mr.
Powell had the knowledge to ... evade the Constitution more effectively, as he
did in the City of Richmond during the massive resistance era, without having
integration, does not commend him to the Supreme Court." John Conyers of
Michigan, representing the Congressional Black Caucus, was more explicit: "We
would conclude... Mr. Powell's own activities on the boards of education, his
close association with a variety of corporate giants .... his membership in the
largest all-white law firm in Richmond, his support of segregated social clubs,
and his defense of the status quo, are inconsistent with the kind of jurist that
... is desperately needed for the court in the 1970's and the 1980's."
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, BROWNTo BAKKE 163-64 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
385. 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
386. See id. at 291 n.7.
387. Id. at 297.
388. See id. at 294.
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intent."9 Apparently, the Baldus study's showing of a three to four-
hundred percent disparity was not sufficiently stark, even when
that disparity cannot be justified in a nonracist way.
Powell also offered a rationale that Justice Scalia had raised
during oral argument: accepting McCleskey's race discrimination
claim would mean that ugly people would be the next group to cry
discrimination. Criminal defendants would not be satisfied with
raising proportionality claims based on race. They would, the Court
prophesied, assert claims that discrepancies in sentencing were
based upon sex, or membership in other minority groups, or indeed,
"upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's facial
characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or
the victim. . . ."" The Constitution "does not require that a State
eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a
potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment." '391 Thus the Supreme
Court equated the American dilemma of race with any other
demonstrable, banal quality, such as ugliness or hair color.
Justice Brennan wrote an eloquent dissent,392 which will
resonate down the years, and which was clearly an opinion written
for the future.393 "[W]e cannot pretend that in three decades we
have completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning
centuries," '' Brennan observed. McCleskey's evidence
confronts us with the subtle and persistent influence of the
past. His message is a disturbing one to a society that has
formally repudiated racism .... Nonetheless, we ignore him at
our peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we
deny its influence on the present.3 95
389. See id. at 293.
390. Id. at 317 (citation omitted).
391. Id. at 319.
392. Justice Powell had the grace toacknowledge the dissent's eloquence. See id. at 313
n.37.
393. For a fascinating discussion in another context of Brennan's use of rhetorical and
literary techniques, see A. W. Phinney, Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law:
Reading Bowen v. Gilliard, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (1989). Guilliard was decided the
same term as McCleskey, and Brennan's dissents in the two cases share striking rhetorical
similarities. For an accessible survey of the recent literature on the connection between
literature and law, see RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 269-316 (1988); see also
Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915 (1961); Robert
Weisberg, Law, Literature, and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1979);
Robert Weisberg, How Judges Speak, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence
as Narrative, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985).
394. 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
395. Id.
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Brennan refocused the case on Warren McCleskey - a black
person condemned to die in the Georgia electric chair.396  By
restoring "a face and a name'3 s7 to the statistical abstractions
emphasized by the majority, Brennan reminded us that, at bottom,
the case was not about numbers, even though it was full of num-
bers, data, and statistical jargon. There was a numbing banality in
using all of this ciphering to resolve an ultimately moral question.
Brennan captured the human dimension lurking behind the
statistics:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked
his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A
candid reply to this question would have been disturbing. First,
counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of
the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more
important than the fact that his victim was white. Further-
more, counsel would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defen-
dants charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3
times as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants charged
with killing blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the
disclosure that it was more likely than not that the race of
McCleskey's victim would determine whether he received a
death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of killing a
white person would not have received the death penalty if their
victims had been black, while, among defendants with aggra-
vating and mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey, 20 of
every 34 would not have been sentenced to die if their victims
had been black. Finally, the assessment would not be complete
without the information that cases involving black defendants
and white victims are more likely to result in a death sentence
than cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant
and victim. The story could be told in a variety of ways, but
McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line:
there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent
role in determining if he lived or died. 8
Brennan also warned that:
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a
fate in no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them
396. Cf. Phinney, supra note 393, at 158-61 (similar technique used in Brennan's dissent
in Bowen).
397. Id. at 161.
398. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
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sounds no echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such
an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of
injustice are not so easily confirmed .... [The way in which we
choose those who will die reveals the depth of moral commit-
ment among the living. 99
Warren McCleskey was executed in 1991.
D. McCleskey: The Legacy
How soon, Sugar, the terrible becomes routine. We've all got
this dangerous built-in talent: For turning horrors into errands.
You hear folks wonder how the Germans could've done it? I
believe part of the answer is: they made extermination a 9-to-5
activity. You know, salaries? Lunch breaks? And the staff
came in and did their job and went home and ate their supper
and slept and woke up and came back and did their job -
That's partly how you get anything done, especially a chore
that's dreadful, dreadful. - Honey? We've all got to be real
careful of what we can get used to.40°
The statistics at issue in McCleskey were impressive - impres-
sive enough to come within one vote of victory in the Rehnquist
Court. But even the Baldus study's numbers paled beside the pre-
Furman statistics on rape.
The McCleskey decision itself might turn out to have a limited
shelf life. Since retirement, Powell reportedly has changed his
mind about McCleskey, in particular, and capital punishment's
constitutionality in general.4 °1  Lewis Powell's post-retirement
399. Id. at 344.
400. CONFEDERATE WIDOW, supra note 1, at 263.
401. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994). Jeffries wrote:
In an interview given in 1990, he went further. "[]f I were in the state
legislature, I would vote against capital punishment. There are approximately
2,500 people who have been convicted of murder and sentenced to death ... and
there have been only about 125 to 130 executions. Capital punishment, though
constitutional, is not being enforced. I think it reflects discredit on the law to
have a major component of the law that is simply not enforced."
One year later, he took the final step. In conversation with the author in the
summer of 1991, Powell was asked whether he would change his vote in any
case:
"Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp,"
"Do you mean you would no accept the argument from statistics?"
"No, I would vote the other way in any capital case."
In any capital case?"
"Yes."
"Even in Furman v. Georgia?"
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repudiation of his own handiwork in McCleskey suggests that the
court might refuse to extend McCleskey to the rape context - where
the numbers are far stronger, and where the racism identified was
race of the defendant as well as race of the victim. Powell's other
most scabrous example of judicial bigotry - Bowers v. Hardwick -
was studiously ignored by the Court in its decision in Romer v.
Evans.402
Someday, perhaps, the Supreme Court will bury McCleskey the
way it buried another racist opinion from another era, Dred Scott
v. Sanford.40 3 Catharine MacKinnon, quoting Bruce Catton, has
noted that Justice Felix Frankfurter "is said to have remarked that
Dred Scott was never mentioned by the Supreme Court any more
than ropes and scaffolds were mentioned by a family that had lost
"Yes. I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished."
Capital punishment, Powell added, "serves no useful purpose." The United States was
"unique among the industrialized nations of the West in maintaining the death penalty," and
it was enforced so rarely that it could not deter. Most important, the haggling and delay and
seemingly endless litigation in every capital case brought the law itself into disrepute. "It
brings discredit on the whole legal system, that the sentence upheld by the Supreme Court
and adopted by more than thirty states can't be or isn't carried out."
For Powell, this was the heart of the matter. The death penalty should be barred, not
because it was intrinsically wrong but because it could not be fairly and expeditiously
enforced. The endless waiting, merry-go-round litigation, last-minute stays, and midnight
executions offended Powell's sense of dignity and his conception of the majesty of the law.
The spectacle of nonenforcement bred cynicism about the law's announced purposes and
contempt for the courts that could not or would not carry them out. Better to have done with
the whole ugly mess than to continue an indecent, embarrassing, and wasteful charade.
But this cannot be the whole story. It is easy to see that the death penalty cases would
offend Powell's sensibilities, but it is not so obvious why he eventually came to oppose capital
punishment. His reverence for the law could also have been salvaged by more rigorous
enforcement. The path of Chief Justice Rehnquist - and increasingly of the court he led -
was not to abolish the death penalty but to see that it could be carried out. After all, the
remedy for nonenforcement was more enforcement, and the cure for delay was dispatch.
Essentially, Rehnquist wanted to make death routine. This was not bloodthirst. No one
enjoyed capital cases or wanted death sentences to be given casually or rashly or with
anything less than scrupulous fairness. But the conservatives did want to get on with it. If
it were to be done at all, better that it be done with reasonable speed and confidence - and
without repeated intervention by the Supreme Court.
When then did Powell disagree? Why did he side in the end with Brennan and Marshall
rather than with his traditional allies? Why did the man who worked so hard to preserve the
constitutionality of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia come twenty years later to
renounce it?
The answer lay partly in the bitter education of the cases. From them Powell learned that
the death penalty would never be routinely applied. Lawyers would exploit every chance for
delay, and judges would be sufficiently beset with doubts to give them frequent opportunity.
This much he learned from himself.
Id.
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one of its number to the hangman. ''40 4 And, as Don Ferrenbacher
observed, Dred Scott "was law to be cited, a lesson to be learned,
judicial vigor to be emulated, political imprudence to be regretted,
but most of all, as time passed, it was an embarrassment - the
Court's highly visible skeleton in a transparent closet. 4 °5
V. CONCLUSION
Monsieur Camus, you gave
The stone of our absurdity a name.
Daily we roll it to our graves.
There's no reprieve.
Later, you wrote that we are best
When we rebel - against the casual
Unfairness of this world, against
Acceptance and the cowardice
It hides, against rebellion
Itself.
Rebelling with your pen,
You called the evil of our age
Our willingness to kill within
The law.4 °6
Because I am a healer, all that I do heals.40 7
I have suggested that, under prevailing proportionality law as
interpreted by the current personnel of the United States Supreme
Court, capital punishment for rape will likely be held to pass
constitutional muster. I have also argued that the racist history of
capital punishment for rape should invalidate it as applied, even
under the base standards of Justice Powell's scabrous opinion in
McCleskey.
There is no reason to expect that Coker eliminated the warping
effects of racism on the criminal justice system. Susan Estrich
wrote in 1987 that "[a]lthough the death penalty for rape is now
prohibited, at least one study has found that black men convicted
of raping white women continue to receive the harshest
404. MAcKINNON, supra note 236 at 206 (footnote omitted).
405. Id. (quoting DON FERRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS).
406. Samuel Hazo, Stop and Be Stopped in Lourmain, in THE HOLY SURPRISE OF THE
RIGHT Now, 239, 239 (1996).
407. MARTIN AMIS, TIME'S ARROW 74 (1991).
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penalties."'  Overrule Coker - or limit Coker's scope to those who
rape adult women - and the structural effects of racism can be
expected to re-emerge, unless the prosecutors cook the books.40 9
From a purely racial perspective, it is indeed appropriate that
Louisiana is the state leading the charge to reinstate capital
punishment for rape in a post-Coker world.41° Between Louisiana's
enactment in 1973 of its post-Furman statute and 1975, thirty-
three men were condemned to die: fifteen for rape and twenty-two
for murder." Of the fifteen condemned rapists, all but two were
Black: Cordell Lee (sentenced on August 19, 1975);412 James
Hawthorn (sentenced on August 15, 1975);113 Hillery Preston
(sentenced on July 28, 1975);... Shedrick Noble (sentenced on June
6, 1975);415 Eugene Stripling (sentenced May 30, 1975);416 Andrew
Johnson (sentenced May 3, 1975);417 Arthur Jones (sentenced March
31, 1975);418 Johnny Ross (sentenced March 21, 1975);419 Billy
Monroe (sentenced October 22, 1974);420 Joseph Gleason (sentenced
October 18, 1974);421 Robert Leonard (sentenced July 18, 1974);422
Lawrence Watts (sentenced July 15, 1974);423 and Herbert Nichol-
son (sentenced June 7, 1974).424
408. ESTRICH, supra note 235, at 107 n.2 (citing Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual
Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842, 842-54 (1980)); see
generally, Jennifier Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
409. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981).'
410. One analysis of Louisiana prison records found that capital punishment was reserved
almost exclusively for Blacks. See Oakly Johnson, Is The Punishment of Rape Equally
Administered to Negroes and Whites in the State of Louisiana, in WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE
HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES
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Between Florida's enactment of its post-Furman statute425 in
December 1972 and 1975, at least two men were sentenced to death
in that state for capital rape.426 Houston Owens, Jr., who was
black, was sentenced to death for the rape of a nine-year-old white
girl.42 7 Jackie Gentry, also black, was capitally sentenced for the
especially brutal rape and nearly-successful murder of his six-year-
old niece.428 He
broke into his sister's house where four children were sleeping,
picked up the victim, and walked out of the house, taking her to
the railroad tracks where he left her nude and unconscious body
between the rails. He was arrested once he returned home but
refused to say where the child was. The next day, [thirteen] cars
of a train ran over her before the engineer could stop the train.
Extensive surgery on the victim was necessary.429
By the time of Georgia's enactment of its post-Furman capital
statute in 1975, at least three men were sentenced to death "for
committing rape in especially serious circumstances (violent
recidivism or brutality).''43°
This law journal essay - my last - has argued that states
probably can, consistent with the court's recent proportionality
cases, execute rapists. This essay exonerates neither capital
punishment generally nor capital punishment for rape specifically,
rather it damns both the Constitution and the Court that allowed
the death penalty to deform the Constitution.
It was one of those crazily surreal moments that even sane
people have every once in a while. I was testifying before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the constitutionality of proposed
legislation 43 1 that would have extended the federal death penalty to
include certain non-homicide crimes, such as attempted assassina-
tion of the President.432 Senator Herbert Kohl asked me whether
425. See generally Charles Ehrhardt & Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response
to Furman: An Excercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973); Note, Florida's
Legislative and Judicial Response to Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 108 (1974).
426. See Brief for Petitioner at 8a, 114a, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (No. 75-
5706).
427. See id. at 8a, 9a.
428. See id. at 114a, l15a.
429. Id. at l15a.
430. Brief for Respondent at 23 n.1, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257).
431. See Death Penalty: Hearings on S. 32, S. 1225, and S. 1696 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 304 (1989) (statement of Michael W. Mello, Assistant Professor of
Law, Vermont Law School) [hereinafter Hearings].
432. See generally S. 32, S. 1225, S. 1696, 101st Cong. (1989).
EXECUTING RAPISTS
I thought that an attempted assassination of the President was a
pretty heinous crime.433 Of course, I agreed with the Senator.3 4
Attempted assassination is a very bad crime, but that is not the
right question. The right question, I suggested, is whether
attempted assassination is a crime worse than rape.43 ' Rape, I
argued, is the relevant datum of heinousness. 46 This is so because
in 1977 the United States Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia,
that, as a categorical matter, capital punishment was a dispropor-
tionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman.
Senator Kohl did not ask me the next question - the one I
dreaded: Would the Court decide Coker the same way today? To
some extent, this essay is my answer to Senator Kohl's unasked
question.
433. Hearings, supra note 431, at 430.
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